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FREEZER BURN: UNITED STATES EXTRATERRITORIAL
FREEZE ORDERS AND THE CASE FOR EFFICIENT RISK ALLOCATION
RACHEL R. GERSTENHABERt
Consider the record of recent American asset freezes1 :
1990: Iraq, upon the invasion of Kuwait;
1988: Panama, before American intervention;
1986: Libya, after a spate of terrorist actions;
1979: Iran, after the seizure of American hostages;
1975: South Vietnam, after the fall of Saigon.
2
The list extends further back,3 and is certain to continue into the
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Professor Richard Herring, of the Wharton school, for his suggestions. Their seminar
gave rise to this Comment, which is dedicated, of course, in honor of my parents.
1 In the face of "any unusual or extraordinary threats" from abroad to national
security, foreign policy, or the economy, the President is endowed with the power to
declare a national emergency and to prescribe regulations which will "regulate or
prohibit... transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking
institution" if they involve designated foreign countries. International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Title II § 202(b), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1702 (1977). See
generally AbnerJ. Mikva & Gerald L. Newman, The Hostage Crisis and the 'Hostage Act',
49 U. CHI. L. REV. 292, 299-300, 346 n.293 (1982) (discussing the Hostage Act, 22
U.S.C. § 1732 (1976), Citizens in Foreign States Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1731 (1988), and
how the Iranian freeze enacted pursuant to IEEPA might have been effected under
these acts).
2 See Iraqi Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 575.201, 575.212(a) (1991) (Iraqi
freeze effective 5:00 a.m. e.d.t., August 2, 1990); Panamanian Transactions
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 565.201,565.301 (1991) (Panamanian freeze effective 4:00
p.m. e.d.t., April 8, 1988); Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 550.201;
550.301 (1991) (Libyan freeze effective 12:01 a.m. e.s.t., February 1, 1986); Iranian
Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.201; 535.208(b) (1991) (Iranian freeze
effective 8:10 a.m. e.s.t., November 14,1979); Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31
C.F.R. § 500.201(a)(1), (d)(1)-(4) (1991) (freeze orders and schedule of countries
including- North Korea, Cambodia, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam).
s See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515 (1991); Nicaraguan Trade
Controls Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 540.204-.209 (1991) (effective 12:01 a.m. e.d.t., May
7, 1985,); 15 Fed. Reg. 9040 (1950) (China). With residual World War II asset
controls, the United States continues to regulate banking transactions between
persons within the United States and Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Outer Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Tibet and other
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future, but with what alarming regularity and with what detrimental
impact on the Eurodollar market4 and its participants?
International political crises often throw financial markets into
a tailspin, especially one so reliant upon the speed of transactions
and liquidity of funds as the Eurodollar market. The turmoil
increases and lingers with continued litigation which has as yet been
unable to provide clear rules enabling parties to international
financial transactions to bargain efficiently and allocate political
risk. The problem is especially acute given the vast sums involved.
This Comment will focus on the primary issues arising from the
use of executive freeze orders5 to block extraterritorial Eurodollar
accounts:6 the uncertainty of the outcome of litigation and the
inefficient allocation of risk. Courts have spurned an economic
analysis of risk allocation and have instead manipulated legal
doctrines, thus producing variable and inefficient outcomes in cases
arising from Eurodollar transactions. 7 Consequently, the United
States government has been slow to acknowledge and internalize the
costs of imposing its will overseas: increased transaction costs in
the Eurodollar market and removal of capital from American banks
and branches. To find a framework providing a clear rule of risk
allocation, this Comment will address the essential question and its
corollary: (1) who should bear the risk of an extraterritorial freeze
order, the depository institution or the target country depositor?;
and (2) what are the consequences and ramifications of such an
allocation decision?
The discussion will in turn consider freezes, defenses asserted
by bank branches impaired by them, an alternative economic
analysis, and the ramifications of such a risk allocation analysis. The
first section will provide background on Eurodollar transactions
necessary for analysis of the issues which arise in a freeze. The
second section will discuss the process of imposing an executive
freeze order and its scope. The third section will critique the
standard legal analyses used in evaluating international deposit
nations. See 31 C.F.R. § 505.10 (schedule of countries). Changes in American policy
following the upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe remain to be seen.
4 See infra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 8-18 and accompanying text.
7 Although extraterritorial freezes have spawned litigation in many countries, this
Comment will be concerned only with American and English decisions, due both to
the close relationship between these countries and London's preeminence as a
Eurocurrency center. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
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disputes. The fourth section will propose an efficient rule of risk
allocation derived from economic analysis, focusing on interest rate
differentials between domestic dollar and Eurodollar accounts.
Lastly, the fifth section will address the consequences of the rule in
foreign policy terms, evaluating the benefits and disadvantages of
extraterritorial freeze orders.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EURODOLLAR MARKET
To discuss the issues involved, it will be useful to outline some
basic aspects of the Eurodollar market: (1) What are Eurodollars
and how are they created? (2) Why is the Eurodollar market
significant? (3) How is the typical Eurodollar transaction effected?
and (4) What are the risks involved in dealing in Eurodollars?
A. Eurodollars Defined and Created
A Eurodollar is a deposit liability8 denominated in dollars of a
banking office located outside the United States, 9 whether or not
in Europe. 10 Eurodollars are a subset of Eurocurrency deposits,
those liabilities of banks generally, denominated in any currency,
1 1
8 The depositor's claim on a bank is a liability to the bank; the bank's subsequent
loan to a borrower is an asset to the bank.
9 See Milton Friedman, The Eurodollar Market: Some First Principles, in THE
EURODOLLAR 273, 275 (Herbert V. Prochnow ed., 1970); THOMAS MAYER ET AL.,
MONEY, BANKING AND THE ECONOMY 522 (1984); MARCIA STIGUM, THE MONEY
MARKET 129 (rev. ed. 1983) [hereinafter STIGUM, MONEY MARKET].
Contrary to intuitive expectations, Eurodollar deposits may be carried within the
United States, but only by domestic branches of foreign banks' international banking
facilities (IBFs). This dispensation was created in an effort to bring more foreign
banking to the United States; such banks might be "constructively" considered outside
the United States. See id. at 188-91; International Banking Act of 1978, § 3103, Pub.
L. No. 95-369, 92 STAT. 607 (1990) (establishing IBFs); HENRY S. TERRELL & RODNEY
H. MILLS, INTERNATIONAL BANKING FACILITIES AND THE EURODOLLAR MARKET 7-9
(1983) (noting that IBFs expand the geographical scope of Eurocurrency markets,
increasing the opportunity for unregulated banking transactions without greatly
increasing foreign investment in the U.S.); see also MARCIA STIGUM, AFTERTHE TRADE:
DEALER AND CLEARING BANK OPERATIONS IN MONEY MARKET AND GOVERNMENT
SECURITIES 16 (1988) [hereinafter STIGUM, AFTERTHE TRADE] (explaining that dollars
deposited in IBFs are also Eurodollars).
10 The term "Eurodollar" is generally recognized to encompass all dollar deposits
outside the United States, including those in Asia (e.g., Singapore), the Caribbean
(e.g., Nassau), and the Middle East (e.g., Bahrain). See STIGUM, MONEY MARKET, supra
note 9, at 130 n.2.
11 Actually, notjust any currency is a likely candidate. At least two characteristics
are crucial: (1) it must be "safe" enough to be internationally acceptable; and (2) it
must be easily convertible into other major currencies at exchange rates not subject
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outside the jurisdiction of that currency.12 Eurodollar deposits
may be fully liquid, or of a longer duration, negotiable or non-
negotiable.
18
The creation of a Eurodollar deposit may be illustrated best by
a streamlined example: 14 IBM Corporation decides to transfer $1
million out of its account at Chase Manhattan Bank in New York
and deposit the funds with Barclays Bank in London, to take
advantage of the higher interest rate offered on Eurodollar
accounts. 15 In transferring the payment obligation on IBM's
demand deposit to Barclays from Chase, a Eurodollar deposit is
created which substitutes for an equivalent demand deposit in the
United States. 16 Barclays will then utilize these funds to grant a
loan to a borrower, or else place the $1 million in the Eurodollar
interbank market.17 Eurodollar deposits are thus "linked" to
to violent or unpredictable changes or controls. See W.P. HOGAN & I.F. PEARCE, THE
INCREDIBLE EURODOLLAR 2 (1982). Others have added requirements, including that
the currency-issuing country: (1) runs a current account surplus (i.e., is a net
exporter); (2) is willing to enable the development of markets for the export of
capital; and (3) does not suffer from heavy inflation. See DAVID F. LOMAX & P.T.G.
GuTmAN, THE EUROMARKETS AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL POLICIES 230 (1981).
12 See ARIE L. MELNIK & STEVEN E. PLAUT, THE SHORT-TERM EUROCREDIT MARKET
4-5 (New York University Salomon Center Monograph Series in Finance & Economics
ed. 1991).
13 See PAUL DAVIDSON, INTERNATIONAL MONEY AND THE REAL WORLD 219-20
(1982) (delineating three types of deposits: fully liquid day-Eurodollar deposits;
longer term, non-negotiable Eurodeposits; and fixed maturity, negotiable Eurodollar
Certificates of Deposit (CDs)).
14 See GUNTER DUFEY & IAN H. GIDDY, THE INTERNATIONAL MONEY MARKET 14-19
(1978) (outlining the transaction described) [hereinafter DUFEY & GIDDY, INTERNA-
TIONAL MONEY MARKET]. In the interest of simplicity, this example specifically omits
changes in the banks' accounts at their respective central banks.
15 The example operates in the reverse as well, with a foreign account holder
creating the Eurodollar demand deposit with funds already in the United States: Iran
receives $1 million in payments for oil at its account at Chase in New York. Iran then
decides to transfer the funds to its Eurodollar account at Barclays in London; the
funds are maintained as Eurodollars since dollars will later be needed to pay for
imports. See CharlesJ. Scanlon, Definitions and Mechanics of Eurodollar Transactions,
in THE EURODOLLAR, supra note 9, at 17, 18-21.
16 Barclays thus now has a claim on the United States banking system via Chase,
although there has been no change in the amount of outstanding dollar liabilities. See
DANIEL R. KANE, THE EURODOLLAR MARKET AND THE YEARS OF CRISIS 132-33 (1983)
(discussing the creation of Eurodollars).
17 See Scanlon, supra note 15, at 17. The interbank market is the market through
which banks place deposits with each other at a wholesale interbank rate, such as
LIBOR, the London Interbank Offered Rate. See ADRIAN HAMILTON, THE FINANCIAL
REVOLUTION 58-59, 247 (1986) (defining LIBOR as "the rate of interest offered by
banks in the London eurodollar market [, and] ... the benchmark for a large
proportion of international loans and floating-rate issues").
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demand deposits in the United States, in that they "represent claims
to demand deposit liabilities of a bank in the U.S. which can be
mobilized at a specific future date."
18
B. The Eurodollar Market and Its Growth
Seemingly as abstract as Eurodollars, the Eurodollar interbank
market, alluded to above, is a forum comprising financial institu-
tions (Eurobanks 19 ) which compete for depositors' dollars and
make loans to borrowers, outside the United States. 20 Primarily
a wholesale market, transactions denominated in sums of $1 million
or more21 are effected by bankers22 at an ever-increasing number
of financial centers23 outside the United States, 24 preeminently
Many scholars are wary of the "pyramidal" creation of Eurodollars which occurs
when one or more intermediary bank places the deposit before the funds are loaned
to the ultimate borrower. See KANE, supra note 16, at 133, 141.
18 DAVIDSON, supra note 13, at 219 (viewing players in the Eurodollar market as
those who "wish to hold or sell (for liquidity purposes) titles to dollar deposits"). See
infra note 108 for further discussion of Eurodollar deposits as rights to repayment in
credits, not cash.
19 A "Eurobank" is essentially any bank that participates in the interbank market,
and has been defined as: "a financial intermediary that simultaneously bids for time
deposits and makes loans in a currency, or currencies, other than that of the country
in which it is located." DUFEY & GIDDY, INTERNATIONAL MONEY MARKET, supra note
14, at 10 (emphasis omitted).
20 See id. at 7 (defining the "international money market... as the Eurocurrency
market and its linkages with other segments of national markets for credit" (emphasis
omitted)). Dufey and Giddy appropriately warn against confusing the Eurodollar
market, a "market[] for credit (the use of funds over time)," with a foreign exchange
market, which is a "market[] for means of payments (money)." Id. at 5.
21 See id. at 14 n.5 (noting, however, that "London dollar CDs" are available in
Eurodollar sums as small as $5,000 or $10,000).
22 The metaphysical quality of such interbank transactions has been enhanced by
technological advances in communications. As one commentator has noted:
You look at your screen and, when you want to deal on one of the prices
quoted, you ring the bank concerned or use the Reuters dealer super-telex
to make the deal and to get your confirmation slip from a printer attached
to the screen. The interbank settlement systems allow efficient settlement
procedures.
HAMILTON, supra note 17, at 58-59. The speed, lack of negotiation and reliance on
settlement of the transaction illustrated here will become significant features to
consider in allocating risk between the parties. See infra notes 174-76 and accompa-
nying text.
2 A range of banking centers has sprung up in recent years. With the "inter-
nationalization of credit transactions," the financial center need not actually supply
the capital, thus enabling new, smaller candidates to enter the ring. DUFEY & GIDDY,
INTERNATIONAL MONEY MARKET, supra note 14, at 36. "Offshore banking" centers
generally offer financial services to nonresident borrowers and depositors, and are
characterized by an absence of "intrusive and expensive official regulations," including
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London. 25 The increased creation of Eurodollars and the enor-
mous growth of the Eurodollar market in recent decades 26 is
largely attributable to United States banking and loan regula-
tions, 27 international monetary shocks, 28 technological advanc-
taxes and restrictions on portfolio management. Id. at 37.
24 In addition to the mainstays, London and Luxembourg, growing financial
centers even as early as 1981 included Asia (most notably Singapore, Hong Kong, and
the Philippines), and the Arabian Gulf (including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates, Bahrain, and Kuwait). Offshore banking exists in the Bahamas, the Cayman
Islands, and Panama. See LOMAX & GUTMAN, supra note 11 at 191-211. Panama was
considered especially attractive because the dollar is legal tender in that country, and
there were no exchange controls. See DUFEY & GIDDY, INTERNATIONAL MONEY
MARKET, supra note 14, at 45-46 (also adding the British Virgin Islands, Grenada,
Curacao and Caracas, Venezuela to the list of offshore banking centers). Panama's
allure as an offshore banking center helps to explain the United States' decision to
freeze the assets at branches of American banks there. See supra note 2; infra note
64.
25 London has long been considered the center of Euromarket activities. See
MELNIK & PLAUT, supra note 12, at 3; Scanlon, supra note 15, at 22 ("Since the
beginning, London has been the major center for trading in Eurodollars."). London's
preeminence was a factor in the decisions in the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank litigation,
discussed infra notes 79-92 and accompanying text.
26 See STIGUM, MONEV MARKET, supra note 9, at 142 (tabulating the growth in the
gross size of the Eurocurrency market from $315 billion in 1973 to $1.86 trillion in
1981, with Eurodollars constituting 74% and 78%, respectively, of all Eurocurrency
liabilities). As of December 1988, the Eurocurrency market was estimated at $4.62
trillion, with Eurodollars still comprising about three quarters of the market. See
JULIAN WALMSLEY, GLOBAL INVESTING: EUROBONDS AND ALTERNATIVES 4-6 (1991).
27 In the 1960s, a combination of loan regulations designed to reduce the United
States' balance of payments imbalance coerced commercial banks into bidding for
funds abroad. See ANDREW CROCKETT, INTERNATIONAL MONEY: ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
178-80 (1977) (citing the impact of the 1964 Interest Equalization Tax on foreign
deposits in the United States, the 1965 voluntary program of restraint on lending to
nonresidents, and controls on direct investment abroad, as factors which hampered
the capacity of American banks to compete for international business).
United States banking regulations also increased the cost of funds in the United
States. See id. at 176-77 (noting that statutorily mandated below-market interest rates
under Regulation Qin periods of tight credit in the 1960s forced banks to turn to the
Eurodollar market, and that reserve requirements raised the cost of funds in the
United States). See infra notes 189-190 and accompanying text. Further, bank merger
laws prevented domestic growth of the banking industry, forcing it to expand
overseas. See LOMAX & GUTMAN, supra note 11, at 29 (describing the limitations on
domestic expansion of American banks).
28 Realizing that the dollar was undervalued and that adjustments would soon be
made, European central banks absorbed Eurodollars in dramatic amounts immediate-
ly prior to the 1971 decision to shift from gold-fixed to floating exchange rates. See
GEOFFREY BELL, THE EuRO-DOLLAR MARKET AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
SYSTEM 90-92 (1973).
In the 1970s, international markets weathered another shock as the OPEC crisis
resulted in a transfer of an additional $150 billion annually to the Cartel's accounts.
See HAMILTON, supra note 17, at 22-23.
EXTRA TERRITORIAL FREEZE ORDERS
es,29 opportunities for diversification and higher interest rates, 0
and convenience to customers.
3 1
A Simple Eurodollar Transaction and Clearing House Settlement
A Eurodollar transaction, requiring the transfer of funds from
IBM's new account at Barclays to Citicorp's London branch, to pay
a European servicer, British Airways (BA), for example,3 2 warrants
illustration, as the mechanism has been pivotal to the defense of
non-payment of frozen assets.33 When IBM asks Barclays to pay
out to BA, Barclays will telex its correspondent bank in the United
States,3 4 Manufacturers Hanover Trust (MHT) and request the
transfer of dollars from its account in favor of BA's account at
Citicorp/London. MHT will then submit instructions to the
2 One commentator has noted that technological advances in communications
have made international transactions easier, and thus more prevalent, by"reduc[ing]
the economic distance between the banking offices and their customers." ROBERT Z.
AUBER, THE INTERNATIONAL MONEY GAME 255-56 (5th ed. rev. 1987). Another noted
that advanced communications have "created an entirely new system of world finance
based on the incredibly rapid flow of information round the world .... [C]ommunic-
ations now enable and ensure that money moves anywhere around the globe in
answer to the latest information or misinformation." HAMILTON, supra note 17, at 30
(quoting Walter Wristo).
o Commentators have noted that the "Euro-dollar market attracts funds because
it offers higher rates of interest, greater flexibility of maturities, and a wider range
of investment qualities than other short-term capital markets." Oscar L. Altman,
Euro-Dollars, in READINGS IN THE EURO-DOLLAR 1, 3 (Eric B. Chalmers, ed., 1969).
The Eurocurrency market generally "offered a range of geographical, country, and
institutional risks which catered to the emerging desire of investors to diversify their
investments." INTERNATIONAL BANKING FACIIrIES HAVE IMPROVED THE COMPETITIVE
POSITION OF BANKS IN THE UNITED STATES 3-6 (1984) (GAO Report to the Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (tracing the development of the
market). The Comment will return to the interest rate issue, see infra notes 185-209
and accompanying text.
-l Since dollars are frequently used to settle international trade contracts,
possessing Eurodollars can facilitate payments: "[T]itles to Eurodollar deposits, to the
extent that they are readily transferable, have the potential to be utilized as the
medium of contractual settlement at least for international contractual obligations."
DAVIDSON, supra note 13, at 221; see also Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust
Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259, 276 (Q.B. 1988) (noting that the depositor gained the
advantage of "both the speed and efficiency with which current account payments
could be made in New York, and the advantage of an account in London bearing
interest at Eurodollar rates").
32 The transaction would function similarly were this an interbank transaction, i.e.,
Barclays loaning Eurodollars to Citicorp overnight.
33 See infra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
34 The correspondent bank is one with which another bank holds an account, and
which will perform business transactions in the United States.
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Clearing House Interbank Payment System (CHIPS) to credit dollars
from its account, in favor of Citicorp's New York office, the
corresponding bank of Citicorp/London.35 At the end of the day,
CHIPS nets out all the transactions of the various member banks,
and credits Citicorp's New York office, which then telexes its
London branch to notify it of the credit received in its favor.3
6
Citicorp's and Chase's reserve accounts with the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (Fed) are similarly adjusted. 7
Although just one of a number of clearing systems38 which
settle a mind-boggling variety of international transactions,
3 9
CHIPS is the clearinghouse most significantly related to dollar
transfers initiated in international markets.40 The clearing system
35 This portion of the example is designed to illustrate that the corresponding
bank often is, but need not always be, a head office of an overseas branch, or vice
versa.
36 For a diagrammatic approach to CHIPS, see James L. Foorman & Sally A.
James, Balanced Banks Have a CHIP on Both Shouldes, INT'L FIN. L. REV., July 1987,
at 26-29. For a simple discussion of wire transfer systems, see MARTIN MAYER, THE
MONEY BAZAARS: UNDERSTANDING THE BANKING REVOLUTION AROUND US 88-97
(1985).
37 See STIGUM, AFrER THE TRADE, supra note 9, at 106-07 (summarizing the
clearing insofar as Fed funds may be transferred: "Wire transfers are.., used to
effect the large payments and receipts of Fed funds that big banks, domestic and
foreign, experience daily as a result of settlement of CHIPS.... ."); Friedman, supra
note 9, at 287-91; Scanlon, supra note 15, at 27.
38 Clearing systems around the globe include: Euroclear in New York (established
in 1968, with 125 participants); Cedel (Centrale de Livriaison de Valuers Mobili~res)
in Luxembourg (a rival established in 1971), see WALMSLEY, supra note 26, at 267-69;
and Tokyo dollar clearing (run by Chase Manhattan's Tokyo Branch). See Libyan
Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259, 275 (1988). The existence
of clearing systems outside the United States seriously undermines the cover theory,
as parties could have intended another system.
Methods of transmission in addition to telexes include: Cashwire; SWIFT
(Society of Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications, a computer link
between banks); EUCLID (the computer link between Euroclear's operations center
and its participants), see WALMSLEY, supra note 26, at 267-71 (discussing the securities
clearing, functioning alongside currency clearing, and diagrammatically detailing the
timing of a transaction's progression through the system); and Fedwire (a link
between Fed banks and insured depository institutions), see STIGUM, AFTER THE
TRADE, supra note 9, at 105-10 (noting Fedwire's capacity in 1988 to complete ten to
fifteen transactions per minute).
39 The list of instruments is exhaustive; suffice it to say that in addition to
Eurocurrencies, the clearing systems handle transactions involving Eurobonds, bonds,
securities, futures, options and swaps. See WALMSLEY, supra note 26, at 275-83
(discussing the trend toward "dematerializing" securities, and settlement of
transactions through clearing systems in Canada, France, Germany, ItalyJapan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States); see also BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLE-
MENTS, RECENT INNOVATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING 149-55 (1986) (discussing
integration of global securities markets and markets for new financial instruments).
40 See e.g., STIGUM, AFTER THE TRADE, supra note 9, at 107 ("[Mlost Eurodollar
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allows the netting of debits and credits of participant banks, and
through them, as illustrated above, of participants' correspondent
institutions, so that Eurodollar transactions can occur at high
volumes daily.41
D. Risk, Very Briefly
International transactions are subject to two types of risk,
political and credit, and parties pay each other to assume these
risks. Credit risk is the risk of default: the risk "that the borrower
will not be able to pay interest on his loan and repay the principal
when it becomes due."42 Political risk, the risk of foreign govern-
mental action, has been defined as "the risk incurred by lenders
and/or investors that the repatriation of their loan and/or
investment in a particular country... is restricted by that country
for political reasons only."
43
Eurodollars are potentially subject to the inimical acts of three
different governments:44 (1) the currency-issuing country (the
transactions-each day, these amount to a huge sum-are settled through CHIPS.").
41 Mayer notes the intangible and fast-clearing mechanism: "And the actual
payments and receipts that the Clearing House certifies when the CHIPS computer
blips its goodnight are (like Fedwire payments and receipts) transfers of the reserve
balances of the settling banks." MAYER, supra note 36, at 92 (also suggesting the
future possibility of multilateral settlements as an innovation on the debtor/creditor
recording system).4 2 THOMAS E. KRAYENBUEHL, COUNTRY RISK: ASSESSMENT AND MONITORING 11
(1985). Foorman andJames note that CHIPS participants are exposed to the credit
risk of their counterparties and their counterparties' settling participants, in what is
termed, "intraday exposure." Foorman &James, supra note 36, at 27. Though brief,
such exposure in the aggregate is staggeringly large. As of 1987, for example, daily
volume rose on peak days to highs of $800 billion, and in 1986 aggregate daylight
overdrafts exceeded $100 billion. See id. at 27-28. The authors do not, however,
consider the inherent political risk, which would no doubt add to the perception of
intraday exposure. Yet they do note that binding rules reduce the risk when both
parties are participants in a single system, see id. at 29, underscoring the need for a
single rule for Eurodollar transactions as well.
43 KRAYENBUEHL, supra note 42, at 3. Sovereign risk has been considered the risk
associated with a loan to or guaranteed by a foreign state, and the possibility that "it
might prove impossible to secure redress through legal action." Id. at 4. Country risk,
composed of political risk and transfer risk, is the possibility that a foreign sovereign
might impose controls on funds as part of economic policy. See id. at 3. See generally
Jote Kassa, A Safety Net for the Eurodollar Market?: Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank,
65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 126, 126 n.4 (1990) (discussing political versus sovereign risk);
Anthony F. Marra, The Overseas Private Investment Corporation, in 2 INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL LAw 165, 168-72 (Robert S. Rendell ed., 2d ed. 1983) (discussing types of
OPIC insurance, including limited coverage available for overseas bank branches).
44 Dufey and Giddy have noted this part of multiple-sovereign risk scenario in
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country in whose currency the deposit is denominated); (2) the host
country (where the branch is located); and (3) the bank chartering
country (where the head office is incorporated).45 Indeed, the
case law reveals that just such risks have materialized, prompting
litigation arising from such actions as revolution followed by
expropriation of bank branches 46  or accounts, 47  exchange
anticipation of the cover theory and Bretton Woods defenses:
Since all Eurocurrency transactions must be cleared through bank balances
in the country whose currency is used to denominate the external claims,
the [London offshore] depositor ultimately receives payment in the U.S. He
could be deprived of his funds at maturity by an action of either the British
or the U.S. authorities, whereas a domestic deposit would be affected only
by actions of the U.S. government. Since, from a regulatory point of view,
all Eurodollar transactions are international transactions, they are all subject
to the risk of intervention by at least two governments.
Gunter Dufey & Ian H. Giddy, The Unique Risks of Eurodollars,J. COM. BANK LENDING,
June 1978, at 50, 53 [hereinafter Dufey & Giddy, Unique Risks]. Dufey and Giddy
assume that the currency issuing country would have some sort of ultimate control
over deposits denominated in that currency, not so much because of the location of
the clearinghouse, but because of the ultimate transfers between accounts of corre-
sponding banks with a central bank.
45 Professor Herring has termed the forums as follows: the "currency jurisdic-
tion," the "residential jurisdiction," and "the charteringjurisdiction." See RichardJ.
Herring, Who Bears the Risk of Controls on EurodollarDeposits? Some Recent Developments
3 (International Banking Center Working paper No. 29, 1988) [hereinafter Herring,
Who Bears the Risk?]. This third type of political risk has not often figured heavily in
Eurodollar deposit disputes, but in fact reveals some of the overlap between credit
and political risk; depositors would require a higher rate of return to place their
money with such banks in part because the bank might become insolvent (credit risk)
due to political upheaval in the home country, even without an expropriation.
46 See e.g., Ngoc Quang Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164, 1172 (6th Cir.
1988) (holding bank liable for repayment of deposit, despite force majeure waiver
clause, when bank closed Saigon office immediately prior to fall of South Vietnamese
government), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2602 (1990); Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A., 735 F.2d 645, 646, 651 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding bank liable after Cuban
revolution for payment of CDs issued from its Vedado branch because bank officials
had assured plaintiffs that "they could be repaid by presenting the certificate at any
Chase branch worldwide"); Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d
854,863 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that new Vietnamese government's expropriation of
branch did not relieve head office of its liability to depositor), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
976 (1982). But see Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 463 N.E.2d 5, 11 (N.Y.)
(holding expropriation of accounts by Castro government relieved bank of obligation
to CD holder), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984).
Sometimes a statute of limitations will bar the action. See Tat Ba v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 616 F. Supp. 10, 14-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (dismissing action to
recover funds deposited in Saigon branches of Chase and Citibank because of New
York statute of limitations), affd 762 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1985); Ngoc Dung Thi Tran
v. Citibank, N.A., 586 F. Supp. 203, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that Citibank had
breached its contract with depositor in closing Saigon branch, but that action was
time-barred). But see Edelmann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 668 F. Supp. 99,102
EXTRATERRITORIAL FREEZE ORDERS
controls,48  and of course, freeze orders, extraterritorial or
domestic.
II. THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF ExEcuTIVE FREEZE ORDERS
AND THEIR LEGAL REPERCUSSIONS
Given the extent of the Eurodollar market, it is clear why any
disruption in its smooth flow causes great worry in financial sectors:
the amounts involved are gargantuan, the liquidity relies on swift,
electronically-effected transactions, and the risk exposure is omni-
present. American freeze orders are about as welcome as the
plague.
Nonetheless, the United States has long used freeze orders as a
foreign policy tool in response to aggression;49 a glance through
the federal regulations noted above would easily supplement a brief
lesson in adversarial American foreign relations. 50 Although some
of the regulations have lasted for decades, 51 the recent freezes
(D.P.R. 1987) (finding claim for collection on certificates issued before Cuban
revolution time-barred), rev'd, 861 F.2d 1291, 1305 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding bank
liable because the bank's actions had effectively amounted to a "separate guarantee
that the deposit [would] be paid despite government expropriation of the deposit").
47 See, e.g., Trujillo v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 273 N.Y.S.2d 700, 704 (1966) (holding
bank's obligation to depositor, the deposed dictator's brother, extinguished upon
confiscation of the account and payment to Dominican Republic National Treasury),
afT'd, 289 N.Y.S.2d 389, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968).
48 Se, e.g., Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A. 660 F. Supp. 946, 947 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (resolving dispute over CDs deposited at Citibank's Manila branch and
obligation of bank after imposition of foreign exchange controls by new Aquino
government), remanded by 847 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1988), on remand 695 F. Supp. 1450,
aff'd, 852 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1988), vacated, 495 U.S. 660 (1990), aff'd on remand 936
F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1991), petitionfor cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3360 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1991)
(No. 91-689); see also Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1126 (5th Cir. 1985)
(affirming district court's dismissal of breach of contract claim against bank by
purchasers of CDs when bank refused to repay in dollars, rather than in pesos as
required by Mexican exchange control regulations); Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 589 F.
Supp. 1465, 1471 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding suit barred by act of state doctrine), aff'd;
762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985); Braka v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 802,
804 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (same); see also infra note 149 (discussing exchange controls).49 The United States blocked German assets during World War II, and enacted
subsequent asset and trade embargoes against the People's Republic of China. See 15
Fed. Reg. 9040 (1950) (codified as amended, after Chinas removal from the schedule
of foreign countries subject to prohibitions, at 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (1991)); see also
45 Fed. Reg. 7224 (1980) (unblocking Chinese assets). See generally Mitchell A. Silk
& Lester Ross, Transnational Deposits, Government Succession, Frozen Assets and the
Taiwan Relations Act: National Bank of Pakistan v. The International Commercial
Bank of China, 8 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAw. 1, 7-8 (1990) (discussing the case history and
the blocking and unblocking of assets of the People's Republic of China).
.0 See supra notes 2-3.
51 Such duration raises the question of freeze versus confiscation. Cuban assets
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against Iran, Libya, and Iraq have had the most significant effects on
the Eurodollar market.
A. Yelling Freeze!
The President 52 possesses broad power to impose an immedi-
ate economic freeze under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA). 3 Executive orders directed at freezing
have remained blocked since the sixties. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(d) (1991). Yet,
despite challenges in the United States, such freezes have not been deemed "takings"
under the Fifth Amendment. See Alexander F. Cohen &Joseph Ravitch, Comment,
Economic Sanctions, Domestic Deprivations and the Just Compensation Clause: Enforcing
the Fifth Amendment in the Foreign Affairs Context, 13 YALEJ. INT'L L. 146, 163, 164 &
n.89 (1988) (citing Tole S.A. v. Miller, 530 F. Supp. 999, 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(holding asset freeze is not a taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment)).
The authors discuss First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987) (finding that the Fifth Amendment may require
compensation for temporary takings due to regulation), and note that courts have
treated the "temporary deprivation of the use of property" as a "form of regulation."
Cohen & Ravitch, supra, at 163. On logical and public policy grounds, denial of
compensation for frozen assets is legitimate: "The very purpose of an assets freeze
would be undermined by a judicial grant of compensation, which would render an
important economic weapon useless." Id. at 164.
52 Although JEEPA directs the President to discuss the impending action with
Congress "in every possible instance," he is not required to consult it in advance.
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1703(a), (b) (1988). The
President is required to keep Congress apprised of actions only once they have been
taken. Id. § 1703(b). See also Richard Pregent, Presidential Authority to Displace
Customaty International Law, 129 MIL. L. REv. 77,91-93, 104-06 (1990) (discussing the
President's foreign affairs powers under other acts as well).
53 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1988). See supra note 1. Other means of freezing assets both
within the United States and extraterritorially are available, but cannot be as swiftly
implemented as a freeze pursuant to IEEPA.
Court-ordered freezes arising from the investigative and litigation process are
often directly related to causes of action, rather than precipitated by them, and are
imposed to prevent further harm to the plaintiff, rather than for use as a political
bargaining chip by a third party. See, e.g., Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d
1355,1364 (9th Cir. 1988) (reh'gen banc) (upholdingpreliminary injunction freezing
less than $10 million in assets of the former Philippine president and his wife), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1541, 1542 (S.D.
Fla. 1990) (disallowing freeze of assets by Government without showing that assets
were connected to illegal activity); Republic of Panama v. Republic Nat'l Bank of New
York, 681 F. Supp. 1066, 1072-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (granting injunction to Panama
under Edge Act, 12 U.S.C. § 632 (1988),which prevents transfer of funds without
prior State Department certification of recognized foreign government officials).
Section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA), chp. 106, 40 Stat. 415
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 5(b) (1988)), has provided a means of blocking
assets in many ways analogous to IEEPA, but was amended in 1977 to restrict
prospectively the President's authority to times of war. The scope of TWEA is
similarly broad, covering the "acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer,
withdrawal.., or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect
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offending nations' assets delegate authority to the Treasury
Department to issue regulations to enforce the orders. These
regulations prohibit all transactions with the target nation without
prior authorization in the form of a license from the Treasury
Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC).M Of such
executive power, 55 one participant in the financial negotiations
during the Iranian crisis noted that, "[b]y a stroke of his pen, the
President of the United States had immobilized over $5 billion in
deposits in other countries and kept them immobilized for 14
months."
56
B. Blocking Target Countries' Assets
The language of the Iranian freeze 57 mandated the blocking
of assets with American entities' subsidiaries, not merely branches,
overseas.58 After experience with litigation during that freeze, 59
the Treasury tailored the Libyan and Iraqi regulations more
narrowly, referring to "U.S. Persons," 6° and restricting only those
to, or transactions involving" the enemy's property. Id. § 5(b)(1)(B). Ultimate
responsibility to control assets rests with the OFAC, as under IEEPA. See 7 Fed. Reg.
1409 (1942) (delegating the President's authority to the Secretary of the Treasury);
32 Fed. Reg. 3472 (1967) (redelegating the Secretary's authority to the Director,
OFAC). For case law, see, e.g., Tran Qui Than v. Regan, 658 F.2d 1296, 1299 n.5
(9th Cir. 1981) (finding Treasury validly blocked funds in the United States of a
Vietnamese bank that had not been fully dissolved before the blocking regulations
became applicable to South Vietnam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).
5 See 31 C.F.R. § 500.801-.802 (1991) (regarding licensing procedures and
applications to unblock assets).
" Presidential power to freeze the Iranian assets under IEEPA withstood
constitutional challenge in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 674 (1981). See
Richard S. Simmons, The Iranian Hostage Crisis: Its Impact on International Financial
Law, in 1 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAw 189, 194-96 (Robert S. Rendell ed., 2d ed.
1983) (concise discussion of the legality of asset controls).
56 Robert Carswell, Economic Sanctions and the Iran Experience, 60 FOREIGN AFF.
247, 249 (1981).5 7 The Iranian regulations restricted transactions of business entities "wheresoever
organized or doing business," as long as they were, or were controlled by persons
"subject to thejurisdiction of the United States." 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.329(d), 535.201
(1991).5 8 See Henry Weisburg, Unilateral Economic Sanctions and the Risks of Extraterritorial
Application: The Libyan Example, 19 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 993, 1000 n.39 (1987)
(noting that the Iranian asset freeze caught about half a billion dollars in French
subsidiaries of United States banks alone).
See infra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
60 31 C.F.R. §§ 550.201-.210 (Libya), 575.201-.212 (Iraq) (1991). "Person" means
"an individual, partnership, association, corporation or other organization." See id.
§§ 550.306, 535.308, 575.314 (defining "Person" in the Libyan, Iranian, and Iraqi
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business entities61 which were "juridical person[s] organized under
the laws of the United States, or any person in the United
States."
62
This slight narrowing of the freeze's coverage reflects the
Treasury and State Departments' growing sophistication and
sensitivity63 with regard to the blockages. 64 Even in engineering
the Iranian freeze, the Treasury specifically confined the freeze to
dollar-denominated accounts with American bank branches, rather
than all dollar accounts.65 Such a revision in the language of the
regulations seems to signal an acknowledgment by policymakers of
the costs of a freeze, an issue to be discussed further below.
C. Legal Responses
In two of the three freeze situations to be examined, target
country depositors have sued the depositary institution for return
of their Eurodollar deposits, action interdicted by American orders.
Although courts have couched their decisions in contract terms,
regulations, respectively).
61 Id. § 550.320 (explicitly defining banking institutions to include the principal,
agent, home office, branch, or correspondent of a bank).
62 See e.g., id. § 550.308 (defining "United States person").
63 Showing additional concern for equity and banking practices, the regulations
have authorized the transfer of funds blocked in a demand deposit account to a
blocked interest-bearing account, as long as the funds are transferred to a blocked
account of a United States financial institution located within the United States. See
id. § 575.503. This regulation seems to have enabled the investment facilities
considered in Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.
discussed infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
64 One curious aberration in the pattern is the Panamanian freeze. In blocking
assets of the "Noriega/Solis regime" the Treasury used the term "U.S. person," 31
C.F.R. § 565.307 (1991), which broadly applied to "juridical person[s]" organized
under United States law, but nonetheless, "intended to express a geographical
limitation," and included only those overseas branches operating in Panama. Id.
§ 565.405. The Treasury may have calculated that a broader freeze would likely catch
few assets, not meriting the international community's opposition. But a freeze
confined to Panama would have great effect given its role as an offshore banking
center, especially for drug cartels. See supra note 24. Such a freeze would be
enforceable through American intervention. This type of extraterritorial freeze quite
rightly elicits the worst criticism of American imperialism. Other regulations, in
contrast, have not even purported to apply the freeze to the target country (e.g., Iran,
Libya, Iraq), as it would have been in vain. Interestingly, the Panama regulations also
provided for the continued functioning of clearing transactions by authorizing
payments to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. See id. §§ 565.202, 565.203,
565.314 (defining interbank clearing payments); see also supra note 37 and accompany-
ing text.
65 See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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purporting to interpret laconic, telexed communications and
account arrangements, at base lurks the question of whether a
foreign court will allow the extraterritorial extension of a United
States freeze.
1. Iran: Moot Court
As was to be expected, the post-revolutionary Iranian govern-
ment responded to the vast immobilization of its assets66 by filing
suit. Although by their language previous freezes had purported to
block overseas assets as well,67 the Iranian freeze6s was the first
to capture significant funds.69 With $5.6 billion in deposits with
foreign branches of United States banks,70 Bank Markazi-the
" At first the American freeze order blocked deposits abroad denominated in
currencies other than the dollar. See Carswell, supra note 56, at 250-51. These assets
were unblocked via license, however, after foreign countries objected to such an
extensive American extraterritorial reach, and since the amounts were considered
rather small. See John E. Hoffman, Jr. & Ian H. Giddy, Lessons from the Iranian
F.xperience: National Currencies aslnternationalMoney, 3J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG.
271,281-82 (1981) (comments from the Conference on the Internationalization of the
Capital Markets).
67 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. IEEPA's broad language allows
controls over all transfers to and from all banks in the event of a national emergency.
68 On November 14, 1979, ten days after United States citizens were seized at the
United States Embassy in Teheran, President Carter declared a national emergency
pursuant to IEEPA and froze all assets of the Iranian government under the control
of the United States. See Carswell, supra note 56, at 247-48; see also Robert Carswell
& Richard J. Davis, The Economic and Financial Pressures: Freeze and Sanctions, in
AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN 173 (Paul H. Kreisberg ed., 1985) [hereinafter Carswell
& Davis, Financial Pressures] (discussing freeze of Iranian assets and the negotiation
of a settlement unblocking them).
69 Carswell has noted that while the funds were frozen overseas, they were not to
be confiscated: "[I]t seemed quite unlikely that [the U.K.] would permit up to six
billion dollars to be removed from the books of bank offices in the U.K. and
confiscated solely on the basis of legislation enacted in the United States, with the
implications that might have for sanctity of contract and equal protection of the law
in the U.K." Carswell, supra note 56, at 251.
70 By all accounts, the order froze much more than had been anticipated. See, e.g.,
Carswell & Davis, Financial Pressures, supra note 68, at 177 (noting that the Iranian
assets frozen were "grossly underestimated at around $6 billion"); Richard W.
Edwards,Jr., ExtraterritorialApplication of the U.S. Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 75
AM.J. INT'L L. 870, 873 n.16 (1981) (noting that the total of funds held with overseas
branches and subsidiaries of United States banks transferred pursuant to agreement
and orders exceeded $5.5 billion);John E. Hoffman,Jr., The Iranian Assets Litigation,
in PRIvATE INVESTORS ABROAD: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 329, 341-42 (Martha L.
Landwehr ed., 1980) (finding early estimates put the aggregate amount at between
$7 and $8 billion). The extraterritorial reach of the block was considered crucial to
its effectiveness, since according to a Treasury Department census, deposits and
securities held by foreign branches of U.S. banks constituted about $5.6 billion of the
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Central Bank of Iran-sued for repayment of its deposits in
England, 71 France,7 2 and Germany. 73
Although a variety of defenses and analyses were proposed, they
were never fully tested in the English litigation since the suits were
rendered moot by the Declaration of Algiers, 74 which orchestrated
the exchange of the American hostages for the release of Iranian
assets. 75 The United States Justice Department specifically con-
ducted "holding actions" in various forums to delay disposition of
the cases because from a diplomatic standpoint, "any court ruling
had the potential of changing the basis of the negotiation either by
encouraging Iran that it might ultimately prevail in court or by tying
up Iran's assets so thoroughly as to preclude a settlement .... "76
In contrast, under a different administration and circumstances,
litigation resulting from the Libyan freeze proceeded to its
conclusion.
total $12 billion affected. See Carswell, supra note 56, at 252, 255 (the total included
$800 million in interest).
71 Bank Markazi's suits against the branches of six U.S. banks were consolidated
for trial. The banks included: Bank of America National Trust & Savings Associa-
tion, Bankers Trust Co., Chase Manhattan Bank NA., Citibank NA., Irving Trust Co.,
and Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. See Edwards, supra note 70, at 876.
72 In'litigation in France against Bank of America and Citibank, Bank Markazi
failed to gain summary dispositions, and experts' reports on issues, though requested,
were never submitted to the Tribunal de Grande Instance. See id. at 876-81;
Hoffman, supra note 70, at 356-59. Note, however, that the experts' report in one
French case came out in favor of the banks that argued a defense to payment based
on the cover theory, discussed in text infra accompanying notes 105-14. See alsoJohn
E. Hoffman,Jr. & Brigid Carroll, Set-off By U.S. LenderBanks Against Off.Shore Deposits,
in SOVEREIGN LENDING: MANAGING LEGAL RISK 211, 212 n.4 (Michael Gruson &
Ralph Reisner eds., 1984) (discussing the French court's appointment of an expert
committee to consider the legal effect of the freeze).
73 The Iranian government sued to vacate judicial attachments on its property and
interests in property obtained by American banks, oil service companies, and
contractors; since it involved court-ordered freezes, the German litigation will not be
discussed here. See Hoffman, supra note 70, at 359.
74 See Carswell, supra note 56, at 252.
75 For a detailed and exciting account of the negotiations, see Roberts B. Owen,
The Final Negotiation and Release in Algiers, in AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN, supra
note 68, at 297, 319-20 (detailing the precise determination of the amounts to be
transferred to an escrow account upon release of the hostages).76 See Robert Carswell & Richard J. Davis, Crafting the Financial Settlement, in
AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN, supra note 68, at 201, 215-16.
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2. Libya: Development of Precedent
Following a spate of terrorist attacks, 77 President Reagan
issued executive orders78 freezing assets of the Government of
Libya. The Libyan Arab Foreign Bank (LAFB) 79 sued on breach
of contract for the return of its deposits at overseas branches of
American banks. First in Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust
Co.80 and then Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co.,81 British courts found in favor of the depositor and
required repayment by the debtor banks.
The hybrid character and operation of the "managed" or
Automatic Fund Transfer (AFT) arrangements, which necessitated
that LAFB have accounts in both New York and London, lay at the
heart of the litigation, and thus warrants some description. In
Bankers Trust, LAFB had a current account in New York (non-
interest-bearing) and a call account in London (interest-bearing),
such that if the balance in New York exceeded a fixed "peg" of
$500,000, any excess as of 2:00 p.m. (e.s.t.) would be transferred in
$100,000 increments to the London account, and vice versa, if the
New York balance fell below the peg.8 2 Similarly, though on a
smaller scale, in Manufacturers Hanover, LAFB had an AFT arrange-
ment with a peg of $250,000 and transfers in increments of $10,000
between a non-interest-bearing account in New York and an
77 SeeJohn Tagliabue, Airport Terrorists Kill 13 and Wound 113 at Israeli Counters
in Rome and Vienna, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1985, at Al (reporting attacks on the Vienna
and Rome airports on December 27, 1985 attributed to Libyan terrorists); see also
Weisburg, supra note 58, at 993 (discussing the terrorist buildup to the Libyan freeze,
including a TWA hijacking and killing of an American serviceman passenger, the
Achille Lauro hijacking and killing of Leon Klinghoffer).
78 See Exec. Order No. 12,544, 3 C.F.R. § 183 (1987), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A.
§ 1701 app. at 269 (West Supp. 1988); see also Exec. Order No. 12,543, 3 C.F.R. § 181
(1991) (earlier order prohibiting United States citizens from trading with and
travelling to Libya).
79 The Libyan Arab Foreign Bank is a corporation engaged in offshore banking,
and wholly owned by the Central Bank of Libya. See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v.
Bankers Trust Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259, 261 (Q.B. 1988).
80 Id.
81 1 Lloyd's Rep. 608 (Q.B. 1989) (relying on Bankers Trust).
82 See Bankers Trust, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 263-64. Although the London Bankers
Trust and Manufacturers Hanover Trust branches' corresponding banks in the United
States were head offices of the same bank, such need not necessarily be the case; a
branch might use an American bank, with which it has no corporate relationship, as
a correspondent. Such a situation would underscore the notion that funds are
actually paid out to different accounts, potentially at different banks, in the simple
Eurodollar transaction.
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interest-bearing account in London.83  The only substantial
difference in the facts of the two cases is that after the imposition
of the freeze order by the President, LAFB, seeking to put its funds
in an interest-bearing account, instructed Manufacturers Hanover
to transfer its excess funds not to London, but to another account
in the United States. 84 LAFB subsequently requested a further
revision of the arrangement to invest the excesses in one-month
time deposits in an International Banking Facility (IBF), 5 which
would pay LAFB a more favorable rate.
8 6
The cases focused on the basic issue of whether an American
bank branch could be excused from repayment of a deposit
denominated in dollars when a freeze order in the United States
prohibited the repayment. Justice Staughton noted that under
generally established principles of contract law, performance of a
contract is excused if the requisite action would be illegal in the
designated place. Bankers Trust argued in defense that use of
CHIPS8 7 in New York was an implied term of the contract, since
a payment in London of such magnitude, $131 million, would
necessitate use of that interbank clearing facility and the New York
account. Finding no such implied term88 and rejecting the impos-
sibility defense, the court found that Bankers Trust could still repay
its debt in London by other means8 9 and was thus obligated to do
so.9° In Manufacturers Hanover, Justice Hirst, relying on Justice
Staughton's opinion, similarly found that there was no implied term
in the deposit agreements requiring that withdrawals from the
London account could only be made through the New York
83 See Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 611.
84 This arrangement constituted an Automatic Investment Facility (AIF). See id.
at 612.
85 See supra note 9.
8 See Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 611-12.
87 See infra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
88 See Bankers Trust, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 277-80 (finding that neither usage nor
course of dealing dictated the use of New York clearing as an implied term).
"9 Justice Staughton suggested other means of repaying the obligation without
running afoul of the freeze order, including- (i) in-house transfer in London; (ii)
correspondent bank transfer; (iii) banker's payment; (iv) other clearing systems
outside the United States; (v) cash-dollar bills; and (vi) cash-sterling. See Bankers
Trust, I Lloyd's Rep. at 280-82. CuriouslyJustice Staughton accepted Bankers Trust's
arguments regarding the nonviability of London dollar clearing as a repayment
option, noting that "the introduction of a very large sum by one participant into the
clearing system would impose an excessive credit risk." Id. at 275. It would seem that
the Justice was most concerned with the stability of the London financial market,
placing it ahead of the interests of the depositor plaintiff.
go See id. at 284.
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account.91 The apparent result of the Bankers Trust and subse-
quent Manufacturers Hanover litigation, reached without actually
ruling on the question, is that the English judiciary will not
necessarily uphold or enforce an assertion of an extraterritorial
freeze pursuant to an Executive Order of an American President.
It is important to note that the Treasury granted a license to
Bankers Trust to enable it, without color of illegality, to transfer
funds to the Libyans after Justice Staughton delivered his opin-
ion.92 The United States' ostensible acquiescence in the English
decision has left open the question of the United States' view of its
ability to freeze dollars in American banks overseas. The subse-
quent freeze against Iraq revived similar issues, with the significant
distinction that host countries with money centers have acted in
unison under the United Nations' resolution against Iraq.
3. Iraq: Lack of a Forum
That the United States would freeze Iraqi assets could have been
considered a foregone conclusion once Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait
on August 2, 1990.93 Already familiar with the protocols,94 banks
91 See Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 625. Hirst further deter-
mined that the AFT arrangement, just as Justice Staughton had considered the
Bankers Trust managed account, was "properly to be regarded as an instruction
equivalent to a mandate, which was terminable unilaterally."
92 See Corinne R. Rutzke, The Libyan Asset Freeze and its Application to Foreign
Government Deposits in Overseas Branches of United States Banks: Libyan Arab Foreign
Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 3 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 241,282 & n.291 (citingJohn
Marcom Jr. & Rose Gutfield, Bankers Trust Cleared by U.S. to Repay Libya, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 13, 1987, at 41 (reporting that the Treasury Department issued a license
permitting Bankers Trust to repay $320.1 million)).
93 See Youssef M. Ibrahim, The Iraqi Invasion: A New Gulf Alignment, N.Y. TIMES,
August 3, 1990, at A1;seealso Glenn Frankel, Iraq's Pre-Invasion ScrambleforFunds Has
Cushioned Impact of Sanctions, WASH. POST., Nov. 9, 1990, at A29, A35 (noting that the
invasion "triggered sanctions that effectively froze most of Iraq's $4 billion in foreign
holdings and cut off oil exports").
9' See Danforth Newcomb, Old Tools for a New Job: U.S. Sanctions Against Iraq,
reprinted in THE IMPACT OF THE FREEZE OF KuwAiTI AND IRAQI ASSETS ON FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 25, 26 (Barry R. Campbell & Danforth
Newcomb eds., 1990) [hereinafter KUWAITI FREEZE IMPACT] (noting that perhaps
because of banks' familiarity with freeze protocols based on prior experience, the
Treasury and OFAC have "focusted] on the specific disputes created by freezing
Kuwaiti and Iraqi assets and ha[ve] issued general licenses to resolve these disputes
first, leaving the formal regulations for later"). The familiarity of banks with the
freeze regulations, and their ability to use prior examples as guides, though
expedient, is also a sad commentary on the regularity with which the United States
has imposed monetary sanctions.
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implemented the Iraqi freeze order, which followed the same
pattern as the previous ones, with the exception that Kuwaiti assets
were frozen as a protective measure as well.95 The United Nations
sanctions9 and vast European and Asian cooperation 9 7 also
distinguish this freeze from those previously discussed. What
litigation may arise, if any, remains to be seen, as many money
center countries have acted in accord with the United Nations'
resolution, effectively precluding suit since repayment of deposits
would be illegal. 98
III. INTERNATIONAL Lxw AND JURISDICTION TO PRESCRIBE:
LEGAL DOCTRINES ALONE CANNOT ALLOCATE RISK
In both Libyan cases, although the courts heard testimony from
market experts, finance professors, and jurists to determine the
status of deposits, they nonetheless rejected practical economic
arguments in favor of attenuated legal theories. In a classic
example, responding to Dr. Marcia Stigum's testimony that
"'[d]ollars deposited and dollars lent in wholesale Eurodollar
transactions never leave the United States,'" Justice Staughton
noted: "That statement no doubt makes sense to an economist. For
95 See 31 C.F.R. Pt. 570 (1991) (OFAC administering Kuwaiti Assets Control
Regulations as protective freeze); 31 C.F.R. Pt. 575 (1991) (Iraqi Sanctions
Regulations).
" President Bush modified the first set of Executive Orders placing a trade
embargo on Iraq and blocking both Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets, with a second set to
complywith the United Nations' resolution. SeeExec. Order No. 12,722,55 Fed. Reg.
31,803 (1990) (Iraq); Exec. Order No. 12,724, 55 Fed. Reg. 33,089 (1990) (Iraq,
second order); Exec. Order No. 12,723, 55 Fed. Reg. 31, 805 (1990) (Kuwait); S.C.
Res. 660, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (Aug. 2,1990) (U.N. resolution condemning the Iraqi
invasion and calling for its immediate and unconditional withdrawal); see also George
K. Walker, The Crisis Over Kuwai, August 1990-Februaty 1991,1991 DUKEJ. COMP. &
INT'L L. 25, 34-40 (discussing the U.N. Security Council's actions and the issuance of
the President's executive orders).97 See generally, KUWAM FREEZE IMPACT, supra note 94 (outlining and reprinting
materials on sanctions imposed by countries including the United States, Canada,
France, Germany, ItalyJapan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom); Sanctions, INT'L
FIN. L. REV., Sept. 1990, at 11-15 (1990) (special section outlining participant
countries' freezes during Gulf crisis).
98 SeeJillian A. Gross, Iraqi-Kuwaiti Sanctions and Choice of Law in the Eurodollar
Market, 22 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 471,524-25 (1991) (foreseeing litigation because of
a mismatch between the U.K. and U.S. sanctions against Iraq, posing the issue of
repayment in the United States on Iraqi claims on U.K. banks); see also, George N.
Grammas, Multilateral Responses to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Economic Sanctions and
Emerging Proliferation Controls, 15 MD.J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1, 12-20 (1991) (discussing
in particular restrictions on the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical
weaponry, and missile technology).
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a lawyer it is meaningless." 99 Given the manner in which Eurodol-
lars are created and transactions are effected and the enormity of
the market, however, such staunch disregard of economists' analyses
could be devastating. In attempting to divine parties' contractual
intentions from telexes, or to derive the arguably equitable
outcomes of the disputes, courts have haphazardly applied ill-
adapted doctrines rather than observe and heed the functioning of
efficient capital markets.
1 ° °
A. Prescribing Law Extraterritorially: Territoriality,
Nationality and Interests
The primary analyses courts have applied may be classified
according to three strands recognized in defining a sovereign
power's jurisdiction to prescribe law extraterritorially, 10 1 as articu-
lated by the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States:10 2 territoriality, nationality, and a balance of
interests or effects.1 03 These three principles have provided the
underpinnings for analysis of extraterritorial freeze orders and
defenses to payment by branches against target countries' claims.
99 Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259, 272 (Q.B.
1988).
" Revealing his general distaste for economic arguments, Justice Staughton
criticized F.A. Mann, an expert on British banking law, on one particularly market-
oriented point, writing- "I am reluctant to disagree with such a great authority on
money in English law, but feel bound to do so. [This] ... is one passage which
appears to me to be an indication of economic rather than legal reasoning." Id. at
279; see also Peter S. Smedresman & Andreas S. Lowenfeld, Eurodollars, Multinational
Banks, and National Laws, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 733, 761 (1989) (noting particularly this
decision-making process, and calling Staughton's opinion "unsatisfying").
101 These bases serve in other areas to determine the scope of U.S. litigation. See
e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1230-36 (1991) (territoriality:
holding that Title VII does not apply to United States employers of United States
citizens outside the United States); Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,
731 F.2d 909, 935-36 (1984) (effects: finding reasonable the exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction given significant territorial effects in antitrust case); Mannington Mills,
Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3rd Cir. 1979) (nationality: with
regard to antitrust legislation, "'Congress in prescribing standards of conduct for
American citizens may project the impact of its laws beyond the territorial boundaries
of the United States'" (quoting Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282 (1952)
(antitrust))); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976) (interests: balancing test used in antitrust case).
102 
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 401 (1987) (providing a general framework for considering a state'sjurisdiction to
prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce law).
103 See id. § 402; see also id. § 414 & reporters' notes 3, 6, 7 & 9 (regarding
jurisdiction with respect to activities of foreign branches and subsidiaries).
1992] 2353
2354 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140: 2333
Yet criticisms of theories aligned with these basic strands1 4-the
cover theory based on territoriality, the separate entity doctrine
rooted in nationality, and the act of state doctrine with its host of
analyses relying on a balancing of interests or effects-reveal that
these doctrines as applied in deposit dispute cases, especially in the
event of a freeze, are flawed.
1. Territoriality: The Cover Theory and Debt Situs
In both the Iranian and Libyan freeze cases, foreign branches of
American banks based their defenses to depositors' claims on the
"cover account theory."10 5 Under this theory, dollar-denominated
accounts with foreign banking offices were considered merely
creditsI ° 6 representing dollar amounts kept in the United
States. 10 7 The foreign branches asserted that they were excused
from payment, since dollar transactions overseas would necessarily
require clearing in the United States, according to a claimed implied
104 Territoriality and nationality as bases ofjurisdiction to prescribe law are not
useful on theoretical grounds, according to some critics who invoke an image of the
state not as "natural, bounded, and enclosed, but as constructed, boundless, and
open, a constellation of authoritative behaviors, or authoritative exercises of
jurisdiction over individuals, events, and property[,].... [an] ever-changing snapshot
emerging from these jurisdictional assertions." Note, Constructing the State Extraterri-
toially: Jurisdictional Discourse the National Interes and Transnational Norms, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1273, 1295-96 (1990). The inadequacies of these theories legitimately
to provide bases forjurisdiction in deposit disputes is due to their firm lodging in
concrete requirements.
105 See Carswell, supra note 56, at 250; see also Carswell & Davis, FinancialPressures,
supra note 68, at 179 n.8 (explaining that, under this theory, "any (even non-U.S.)
bank holding an Iranian dollar account overseas would be deemed to be holding a
corresponding amount in the United States"). This nomenclature derives from the
use of "cover" or clearing accounts maintained by foreign banks with their
corresponding banks in the United States to facilitate payments. See supra notes 18
& 31 and accompanying text.
106 F.A. Mann, the English jurist, has suggested a distinction between "monetary
obligations" and credits, and has considered bank accounts, especially extraordinarily
large ones, as the latter, since banks have no expectations of payment or discharge
of debts "other than through the medium of a credit to an account with another
bank." F.A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 63, 194 (4th ed. 1982). One might
compare such credits to commodity options: the average investor with a long
position in corn has no desire actually to take delivery of the bushels of corn for
which she has a contract, but rather expects to trade the option at a profit prior to
the delivery date; the only difference is that corn must ultimately be used rather than
continually traded or it rots-not so with money.
107 Stigum has noted: "The first important point to make about Eurodollars is
that regardless of where they are deposited-London, Singapore, Tokyo, or Bahrain-
they never leave the United States. Also, they never leave the United States regardless
of where they are lent .... " STIGUM, MONEY MARKET, supra note 9, at 130-32.
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term of managed account agreements. Performance would thus be
in violation of United States asset control regulations.1
0 8
The cornerstone of the cover theory defense is territoriality: the
brief Eurodollar U-turn through CHIPS, as previously illustrated,
necessary to clear a transaction in New York,1° was considered
sufficient territorial basis to endow the United States with prescrip-
tive jurisdiction. 10 However, as the existence and development
of other clearing systems outside the United States demonst-
rate,111 an argument based on the location of the clearing func-
tion has limited use. Moreover, interbank clearing systems are
significant112 not because use of them, perhaps required by an
implied contractual term, would provide an esoteric basis for debt
situs (territorial location)113 and territorial jurisdiction, but rather
because of the necessary liquidity they provide to the Eurodollar
market.
114
10 Although it can never be impossible to perform monetary obligations, since
shifting the location or means of payment in contingent circumstances can enable
repayment in another place, Mann concludes that discharge of bank accounts as
credits "may become impossible." MANN, supra note 106, at 66 n.19, 194. He has
observed that, "as economists have said, the Eurodollar market is a mere account
market rather than a money market;" i.e., players in the Eurodollar market never
expect to receive or pay out in cash. Id. at 194. Of course, the primary problem with
Mann's analysis is that the British courts have not accepted it, despite its accuracy
insofar as bankers understand their own industry. See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v.
Bankers Trust Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259, 280 (Q.B. 1988) (Staughton,J.) ("I have not
accepted the argument which Professor Goode refers to, that it is well understood
that [Eurodollar] deposits cannot be withdrawn in cash.").
109 See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
110 But compare the treatment of similar arguments in securities fraud decisions
where actions in the United States have been relatively more extensive. Merely
preparatory actions taken within the United States have been considered insufficient
to grant the United States jurisdiction. See, e.g., IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001,
1018 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that engagement in "mere preparatory" activities such
as exchange by American attorneys of a purchase agreement for an overseas
transaction and minor drafting do not constitute conduct in the United States
sufficient to confer jurisdiction in a fraud action). But see Civil Aeronautics Bd. v.
Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, 591 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding
confirmation in United States of flights sufficient basis for Civil Aeronautics Board
to subpoena documents extraterritorially pursuant to investigation).
... See supra note 38.112 See STIGUM, AFTER THE TRADE, supra note 9 (entire work discussing significance
of clearing operations).113 See infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
114 See STIGUM, AFTER THE TRADE, supra note 9, at 121-50 (discussing clearing
systems for wireable securities). As increasingly more transactions are effected by
wire, general clearing facilities will become more significant, and situs of formerly
"tangible" assets will become difficult to determine as well.
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2. Nationality: the Separate Entity Doctrine
Based on conceptions of nationality as expressed in the
Restatement, the United States could claim jurisdiction to prescribe
law affecting American corporate citizens. 115 Under the separate
entity doctrine, courts have sometimes treated branches as separate
entities, and have refrained from imposing one banking office's
liability upon another.116 The rationale for this doctrine derived
from the fear of a bank's double liability if a depositor were to be
paid at one branch and again at another, before notice could be
received at the first.117 Under the ultimate liability doctrine, the
obverse of the separate entity doctrine, the home office of a bank
may be liable for obligations undertaken by a branch.118  This
1 15 
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 414 and
Reporters' Note 1; see also JAMES V. HOUPT & MICHAEL G. MARTINSON, FOREIGN
SUBSIDIARIES OF U.S. BANKING ORGANIZATIONS 1-2 (1982) (discussing banks'
preferences for branch organization overseas rather than separately incorporated
subsidiaries); Paul N. Filzer, The Continued Viability of the Act of StateDoctrine inForeign
Branch Bank Expropriation Cases, 3 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 99, 102-07 (1988)
(discussing the expansion of the multinational corporation, and the predominant
choice of branches as the form of overseas banking facility).1 16 See Ethan W. Johnson, Comment, Reducing Liability of American Banks for
Expropriated Foreign Branch Deposits, 34 EMORY L.J. 201, 214 n.100 (1985) (discussing
garnishment and attachment cases holding home offices' and branches' funds to be
separate); Edmund W. Sim, Note, Throwing a Monkey Wrench Into the Wheels of
International Finance: Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 11 MICH.J. INT'L L.
1039, 1049, 1050 & n.72 (1991) (discussing the separate entity doctrine, and citing
Pan-American Bank & Trust Co. v. National City Bank, 6 F.2d 762, 767 (2d Cir. 1925)
("[T]he branch is not a mere 'teller's window'; it is a separate entity."), cert. denied,
269 U.S. 554 (1929)). See generally Shawn E. Flatt, Case Comment, Citibank, N.A. v.
Wells Fargo Asia Ltd.: A Threat to U.S. International Banking?, 1991 DuKEJ. COMP.
& INT'L L. 241,251-59 (discussing the single and separate entity doctrines at both the
New York state and federal levels).
117 See Cronan v. Schilling, 100 N.Y.S.2d 474, 476 (Sup. Ct.), affd 126 N.Y.S.2d
192 (1950) (espousing the separate entity doctrine because, "[u]nless each branch...
is treated as a separate entity .... no branch could safely pay a check drawn by a
depositor without checking with all other branches and the main office"); Chrzanow-
ska v. Corn Exchange Bank, 173 A.D. 285, 290-91 (1916), affd, 122 N.E. 877 (1919)
(holding that bank need not honor check written on another branch because allowing
a depositor to demand repayment at any office "would produce endless confusion");
see also Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 226 (1905) ("It ought to be and it is the object
of the courts to prevent the payment of any debt twice over."), overruled on other
grounds by Shaffer v. Heitner, 432 U.S. 186 (1977).
1
1 8 See Patrick Heininger, Liability of U.S. Banksfor Deposits Placed in Their Foreign
Branches, 11 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 903, 924-25 (1979). The controlling decision in
this area continues to be Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 224 N.Y.S. 102 (Sup.Ct.
1927) (holding that the home office of the Russian branch of an American bank
which had wrongfully failed to pay out a depositor in the wake of the Russian
Revolution could be held liable), aff'd mern., 227 N.Y.S. 907, aff'd, 164 N.E. 745
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theory of liability has also given rise to a concept of "springing
debt," in which a debt may be demanded and repaid at any
branch.119
The potential for a court's result-oriented, fact-intensive
adoption of one of the competing doctrines of bank corporate
relationships is highlighted in a freeze situation. The depositor and
depository institution would argue the reverse 120 of their standard
positions in a freeze scenario (the bank invoking ultimate liability,
the depositor claiming the separate entity doctrine), 121 easily
allowing a court to choose the doctrine most suited to its desired
results.12 2 Moreover, the separate entity theory has lost its equity
(1928); see also H. Thomas Byron III, A Conflict of Laws ModelforForeign Branch Deposit
Cases, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 672 (1991) (discussing the "ultimate liability doctrine'
deriving from banking cases in the 1920s).
119 See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, NA., 660 F.2d 854, 862 (2d Cir.
1981) (adopting the argument that if a branch is closed, the "'situs of the debt
represented by the deposit would spring back and cling to the home office'" (quoting
Heininger, supra note 118, at 975)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); see also Garcia
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645, 651 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding
nationalization of bank branch by Cuban government insufficient to extinguish bank's
obligation to pay CD where bank officers offered reassurances that debtors could
demand repayment in dollars at any branch). This basic rule derives from Harris v.
Balk, 198 U.S. at 215 (holding that power to enforce payment of a debt depends on
jurisdiction over the debtor).
120 In the event of an exchange control or expropriation, the depositor would
argue in favor of ultimate liability, since she could then demand repayment at any
office. But the bank would advocate the separate entity doctrine, in an effort to sever
its ties with the misbefallen branch, and bar the depositor's claims. In a freeze,
however, the roles are reversed with the bank arguing for the ultimate liability
doctrine, (claiming regulations affecting the head office necessarily extend to the
branch), and the depositor invoking the separate entity doctrine (to preclude
extension of the freeze to her branch).
An exception to the separate entity doctrine, however, specifically prevents its
application in the event of expropriation. See, e.g, Bluebird Undergarment Corp. v.
Gomez, 139 Misc. 742, 744 (N.Y. City Ct. 1931) ("Not only are branch banks separate
entities, but deposits made in a branch bank are payable then and there only except,
if the branch be closed,... then demand will lie against the parent bank.") (citations
omitted).
121 In analogous circumstances involving set-offs, one observer noted the problem
arising from banks' consideration of a foreign borrower government's various
agencies as separate entities to facilitate the extension of multiple loans, in contrast
with banks' eagerness to view the agencies as parts of a whole, to enable set-offs of
losses against deposits at the bank in the event of a freeze or other impediment to
repayment. See M.S. Mendelsohn, Iran Hostage Deal Leaves Unsettled Issues of
International Contract Law, AM. BANKER, Feb. 3, 1981, at 1, 15 ("But it is clearly
impossible to have this argument both ways-to claim that a government and its
agencies are separate entities for purposes of building up loans, while also claiming
that they are a single entity for the purpose of clawing back loans.").
122 The separate entity doctrine, however, seems to be on shaky ground. See, e.g.,
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justification because the speed of electronic transactions has
dramatically reduced the threat of a bank's double payment at
different branches due to a time lag in record-keeping.
23
3. Interests / Effects Balancing Tests
The third basis of jurisdiction to prescribe law derives from a
balance of forums' interests and often includes notions of reason-
ableness 124 or comity. 125 But such balancing tests, while pur-
portedly solicitous of states' interests, are especially prone to tipping
the scales in favor of the jurisdiction in which the action is brought.
First Nat'l Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 658 F.2d 895, 900 (2d Cir. 1981)
(rejecting separate entity doctrine where bank branches which had issued letters of
credit were expropriated after Cuban revolution), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1091 (1982).
123 In Digitrex, Inc. v. Johnson, 491 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the court took
stock of changes in banking technology and rejected the separate entity doctrine,
since most large commercial banks,
use[] highspeed computers with central indexing capabilities to keep track of its
depositors' checking accounts. The employment of these computers, together
with other sophisticated communications equipment, has enabled the Bank to
monitor checking accountsfrom its main ofice .... Under these circumstances,
service of a restraining notice at the Bank's main office promotes, rather than
endangers, the orderly transaction of banking business.
Id. at 68 (quoting counsel for Manufacturers Hanover). In Digitrex, the court changed
the rule of law based on changed practicalities in the banking system. Similar
enlightenment would be useful with regard to freeze orders of Eurodollars. See also
Byron, supra note 118, at 675 ("The separate entity doctrine developed in response
to the difficulty ofinterbranch communication before the days of instant telecommu-
nication and global computer networks.").
124 Section 403 of the Restatement provides a laundry list of elements to consider
in determining whether the exercise ofjurisdiction by any sovereign over a person
or activity is "reasonable," including- 124
(a) the link of the activity to the territory...
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity...
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation
to the regulating state,....
(d) the existence ofjustified expectations... [and]
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system ....
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 403(2) (1987).
1 25 ee e.g.,Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1 (1991)
(discussing at length comity in international law).
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a. The Act of State Doctrine and Its Tests
The act of state doctrine has provided yet another mode of
analysis of risk allocation in international deposit disputes, often
acting as a choice of law rule by allowing a court to uphold or
ignore a foreign government's act.126 As initially and broadly
articulated, the doctrine held that "the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory."
127
Refinements on the principle have restricted its application to
acts perpetrated by a sovereign within its own territory.128 If
American branches abroad could have established that the deposits
frozen were located within the United States, they might have
argued that a freeze was an act of state. Since the operation of the
doctrine has relied on a factual or legal determination of the
location of an act or property, and because the location of debt is
not immediately evident in the case of freezes of funds (which may
or may not be said to "spring back" to the head office), 129 the
door remains open to politically-based conclusions of law or
fact.18 0 Idiosyncratic applications'8s of the doctrine based on
126 The literature in this area is voluminous; this Comment discusses the doctrine
only in that it may be viewed as a defense to repayment based on the location of the
debt or debtor, and as a key for choice of law, despite objections that the doctrine
does not operate that way. See Michael Gruson, The Act of State Doctrine in Contract
Cases as a Conflict-of-Laws Rule, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 519, 529-38 (arguing that the act
of state doctrine functions as a choice of law rule in contract cases and cases involving
the expropriation of tangible property). But see Clyde Crockett, The Relationship
Between the Act of State Doctrine and the Conflict of Laws and Choice-of-Law Rules, 10
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 309 (1989) (arguing that the act of state doctrine
does not act as a choice of law rule); see also F.A. MANN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN ENGUSH
CouRTs 164-82 (1986) (discussing the doctrine of the foreign act of state, and stating
in reaction to an American case invoking the act of state doctrine to avoid
embarrassment to a foreign sovereign: "In England there is, or ought to be, no room
for an attitude which implies subservience to the imaginary idiosyncracies of foreign
States.").
127 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). The doctrine also
encompasses a separation of powers rationale, that foreign policy determinations are
more appropriately concluded by the executive branch.
128 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) ("[W]e
decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of
property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government ...
' 29 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
130 Qualifications on the doctrine have been well-warranted in certain egregious
situations. In considering some of the cases in United States courts as a result of
World War 1I, one scholar has aptly written, "American courts found themselves hoist
by their own Act of State petard in cases arising from the World War II Nazi
confiscations ofJewish property under the infamous Nuremberg Laws...." EUGENE
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interests arguments reveal that it has been invoked conveniently at
best and inconsistently at worst.1 - 2 A range of tests devised to
determine whether or not the doctrine applies have only added to
the lack of consistency in decisions, some of which will be discussed
here.
i. Discarding Situs: Location of the Debt
A prerequisite determination under the act of state doctrine has
been the location of the debt at issue.1 33 Academics,1 34 crit-
ics,1 35 and members of the judiciaryis 6 have long criticized the
F. MOONEY, FOREIGN SEIZURES: SABBATINO AND THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE 66
(1967); see also MOONEY supra at 70-72. Of course the State Department's Bernstein
letter practice and later the Hickenlooper Amendment enabled public policy
exceptions to the Act of State doctrine. See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-
Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375,376 (2d Cir. 1954) (following
letter from State Department, court held that act of state doctrine did not apply to
expropriation ofJewish citizens' propertyby German government during World War
II); see also Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. 2370(e)(2) (1990) (precluding
invocation of the act of state doctrine with respect to confiscations or takings in
violation of international law).
131 Two other exceptions to the doctrine, the treaty and commercial activity
exceptions, exist as well. See e.g., Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1114-19
(5th Cir. 1985) (expounding the two exceptions in exchange control cases).
132 Compare Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 463 N.E.2d 5, 11 (N.Y. 1984)
(holding act of state doctrine precluded court's inquiry into confiscation of bank
branch during Cuban revolution), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984) with Garcia v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, NA., 735 F.2d 645, 651 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding acts of
Cuban government in confiscating bank did not warrant application of the act of state
doctrine). See also Joseph B. Frumkin, Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Sovereign
Defaults on United States Bank Loans: A New Focus for a Muddled Doctrine, 133 U. PA.
L. REV. 469, 471-85, 472 n.16 (1985) (analyzing the doctrine and its exceptions to
show that the legislative, executive, and judicial branches are uncomfortable with a
rule which denies plaintiffs a forum, and that there is a common misunderstanding
by the courts of the purpose behind the doctrine);John L. Warden, Choice of Law and
Act of State Questions in International Banking Transactions, in PRIVATE INVEsTORs
ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1984, at 281,308
(1984) (noting that Second Circuit decisions have created "unjustifiable uncertainty
as to ... the contingent liabilities of United States banks for foreign deposits").
133 Location of the debt has frequentlybeen construed as movingwith the debtor.
See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905), overruled on other grounds by Shaffer v.
Heitner, 432 U.S. 186 (1977).
134 One economist has noted, "The determination of'situs'is ... a powerful way
of hacking through the tangled undergrowth of legal complexity; but it succeeds at
a cost of some violence to the reality of international financial transactions." Herring,
Who Bears the Risk?, supra note 45, at 11.
135 One jurist, for example, has questioned the assumption that debt, really only
a claim to property, need be assigned a situs like tangible property, given that it
produces different expectations:
EXTRATERRITORIAL FREEZE ORDERS
legal fiction of "situs", especially as it has been ascribed to debt
merely in order to apply one forum's law,1 37 without tackling the
economic and policy issues which should inform the decision to
allocate liability.13 8 Yet even while recognizing that determining
[T]here appears to be no necessity why title to intangible property should
be governed by the same choice of law rule as tangible property. The situs
of a debt is not there for all to see and expect in quite the same way as is
the place where one would find a piano or a painting.
P.J. Rogerson, The Situs of Debts in the Conflict of Laws-Illogica; Unnecessary and
Miseading, 49 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 441, 454, 458-59 (1990) (favoring a view of debt as a
contractual right); see also, Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.2d 657, 660
(2d Cir. 1988) ("'[T]he rule being that debts as such have no locus or situs, but
accompany the creditor everywhere, and authorize a demand upon the debtor
everywhere.'" (quoting Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. at 225)), vacated and remanded, 495
U.S. 660, on remand, 936 F.2d 723 (1991), petitionfor cert.filed Oct. 24, 1991 (No. 91-
689).
3s' Discussing confiscations even in the late 1950s, one Swedish member of the
judiciary wrote:
[A] serious objection to the territoriality doctrine is that debts and industrial
and literary property rights like trademarks and patents can have no situs in
the strict sense of that word. It is only a legal fiction to say that such
intangibles have a situs, and the purpose of the fiction is merely to enable
a court to apply ... the lex rei sitae as if the intangible were a tangible,
situated at the place in question .... Instead ofaskingfor the situs of the debt,
we should ask for the rules according to which confiscations of debts and other
intangibles have to be adjudged ....
Lars A.E. Hjerner, The General Approach to Foreign Confiscations, in SELECTED
READINGS ON PROTECTION BY LAW OF PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS 523, 553
(George W. Ray, Jr. & Andrew R. Cecil eds., 1964) (emphasis added). Hjerner has
written more recently as the Vice Chairman of the International Chamber of
Commerce's Commercial Practices Commission, drafting portions of INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, FORCE MAJEURE AND HARDSHIP (1985).
1
37 Taken to its logical conclusion, the fiction has given rise to multiple situses,
each for different purposes, and even potentially, for different desired results:
The situs of intangible property is about as intangible a concept as is known
to the law. The situs may be in one place for ad valorem tax purposes; it
may be in another place for venue purposes, i.e., garnishment; it may be in
more than one place for tax purposes in certain circumstances; it may be in
still a different place when the need for establishing its true situs is to
determine whether an overriding national concern, like the application of
the Act of State Doctrine is involved.
Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 714-15 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968) (references and citations omitted).
1"5 Note that the use of the word "situs" with regard to accounts has the
misleading effect of reifying the property interest and reducing it to a thing as to
which one can adjudicate based on similarly concrete notions. See, e.g., Libyan Arab
Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259,276 (Q.B. 1988). Considering
Eurodollars in their most concrete terms,Justice Staughton preposterously suggested
that Bankers Trust might pay the $131 million in cash, since it was unwilling to keep
sufficient dollars on hand: "[Dollar bills] could be obtained from a Federal Reserve
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situs in modern financial markets with advanced telecommunica-
tions is often ludicrous, professors1 3 9 and judges have nonetheless
fallen back on situs as a solution. Justice Hirst, for example, easily
designated situs in London to fit the policy his court required in
Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 140 that of preserving the integrity of
the City of London.14 1 The fictive location of the debt designates
the applicable law, and thus the risk allocation rule; but such
interest-oriented situs analysis fails to provide the consistency
necessary for an efficient global financial community.
ii. Expectations: Incidents of the Debt Analysis
An "incidents of the debt" analysis entails the evaluation of
various aspects of the deposit agreement to arrive at the situs of the
debt, which will act as a key to the applicable law and assignment of
liability.142  Considering such elements as jurisdiction over the
Bank and sent to London by aeroplane, although several different shipments would
be made to reduce the risk. The operation would take some time-up to seven days."
Id. He noted that the bank would want to charge for the service, and would likely
suspend interest payments in transit. A more inefficient manner of accomplishing
international financial transactions would be difficult to devise.
139 As Smedresman and Lowenfeld concede, it is indeed "surprising--and ...
certainly ironic-after sixty pages of discussion of currencies without a country and
of credits issued, transferred and extinguished by entries on linked computer
terminals, to put forward a rule based on territoriality .... " Smedresman &
Lowenfeld, supra note 100, at 799-800.
140 Justice Hirst wrote:
In the age of the computer it may not be strictly accurate to speak of the
branch where the account is kept. Banks no longer have books in which they
write entries; they have terminals by which they give instructions; and the
computer itself with its magnetic tape, floppy disc or some other device may
be physically located elsewhere. Nevertheless it should not be difficult to
decide where an account is kept for this purpose, and is not in the present
case .... At all events I have no doubt that the London account was at all
material times "kept" in London.
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 494,
499 (Q.B. 1988) (Hirst, J.), af' 1 Lloyd's Rep. 609 (Q.B. 1989).
141 See id. at 504 (Hirst, J.) ("[Ilt is of the utmost importance to the reputation of
the City of London as a banking and financial centre that customers of a London-
based bank should be able to recover without difficulty debts admittedly owed by the
bank."), affd, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 609 (Q.B. 1989).
142 See Margaret E. Tahyar, The Act of State Doctrine: ResolvingDebt Situs Confusion,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 594, 611-13 (1986). These factors are strongly reminiscent of
elements of the "center of gravity" test, which requires the forum court to determine
which state has the most significant relationship to the subject matter of the dispute,
by considering contact with the forum, such as place of contracting and negotiation,
place of performance and place of business of the parties. See Filzer, supra note 115,
at 137-38. These elements also run parallel to the Restatement's "reasonableness"
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debtor, place of payment, intent as to governing law, and denomina-
tion of the currency, courts may determine whether the "foreign
sovereign ha[d] reasonable expectations of dominion over a
debt."143 But the "incidents of the debt" analysis is also an
interests balancing test in disguise, which merely reduces the
liability problem to a series of discrete factors and seemingly grants
paramount importance to the foreign sovereign's expectations.
14
In applying competing policy arguments, 145 courts in different
countries or jurisdictions may easily arrive at diverse conclu-
sions.
146
criteria. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1987).
143 Tahyar, supra note 142, at 616; see also Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,
463 N.E.2d 5, 8 (1984) ("[A] debt is located within a foreign State when that State has
the power to enforce or collect it."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984). See generally
Kenneth L. Miller, Debt Situs and the Act of State Doctrine: A Proposalfor a More Flexible
Standard, 49 ALB. L. REv. 647,675-80 (1985) (suggesting that equitable results would
more likely result were the act of state doctrine invoked along a continuum of the
foreign sovereign's expectations of dominion).
Tahyar has written: "If the relationship of the debt to the foreign nation is
such that the foreign sovereign could reasonably expect deference to its attempt to
change the obligation, then the situs of the debt must be within that foreign
sovereign's territory, and the act of state doctrine should apply." Tahyar, supra note
142, at 610 (emphasis added). Tahyar smuggles in a test balancing sovereigns'
interests by injecting a notion of reasonable expectations, which may very well be
different depending on the forum. See also Stuart H. Coleman, Note, Act of State
Doctrine Held Inapplicable to Foreign Seizures When the Property at the Time of the
Expropriation Is Located Within the United States: United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l,
Inc., 9 INT'L L. & POL. 515 (1977) (discussing the expectation of dominion).
145 One critic has argued: "Even within this general system of reasonableness,
however, areas can exist where issues are so important to states that they are unlikely
to concede that their individual interests are subordinate to interests of another
state." Robert B. Thompson, United States Jurisdiction Over Foreign Subsidiaries:
Corporate and International Law Aspects, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 319, 399-400
(1983) (Thompson further noted that "[c]ontrol over foreign subsidiaries is usually
invoked in such a situation .... In focusing on the real conflict between two states,
the use of the device of the corporate entity to hide the interests of one side should
be avoided").146 SeeJonathan M. Clark,Jr., Note, The Resolution of Act of State Disputes Involving
Indefinitely Situated Property, 25 VA.J. INT'L L. 901,928 (1985) ("The 'law and policy'
analysis is inherently subjective and unpredictable since it depends on the court's
assessment of the myriad laws and policies of the United States that a foreign decree
might conceivably implicate.").
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iii. Meaningful Relief
Attempts to assign liability according to a "substantially
effective" analysis, that is, whether a foreign government's acts
within its own borders are such that "United States courts will be
unable to grant meaningful relief," also miss the point.147 Such
analysis places the remedy before consideration of the forum's
jurisdiction to prescribe law, making it impossible for parties to plan
based on an expected result. Recall that the Treasury granted a
license permitting payment in the Libyan cases; 148 had it not done
so, the branches might have been unable to pay out. Such an
outcome would have left bankers with even less of a consistent
course to follow.
b. IMF Approval: A Partisan Policeman
Other theories focusing on countries' interests as mediated by
International Monetary Fund (IMF) approval of either "exchange
controls" 149 or "exchange contracts"150  provide defenses of
freeze orders. According to Article VIII, section 2(a) of the Articles
of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (Fund Agree-
147 See Frumkin, supra note 132, at 492-96. This analysis seems particularly results-
oriented, putting the remedy-enforcement "cart" before the prescriptivejurisdiction
"horse," without resolving any issues of whether the court ought to be able to grant
meaningful relief based on legal and equitable notions. See also Karen L. Gold-
thwaite, Comment, Recent Approaches to Situs of Debt in Act of State Decisions, 1 CoNN.
J. INT'L L. 151, 181 (1985-86) (discussing the "fait accompli" test, and noting that
"predeterminations of the outcome by reclassification of the res really represents an
avoidance of analysis").
148 See supra note 92; see also Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660
F.2d 854, 865 n.6 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that plaintiff's assets were issued a license
before judgment, but only by the Federal Reserve Bank), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976
(1982).
"149 Exchange controls are government-imposed regulations on a country's own
banking industry restricting the conversion of currencies. These restrictions are
usually imposed in order to prevent the flight of capital.
The exchange control theory was once litigated in the United States. In Libra
Bank, Ltd. v. Banco Nacional De Costa Rica, the Costa Rican national bank defaulted
on a $40 million loan. After the court determined that the exchange controls
imposed by that government did not operate as a defense to payment based on the
act of state doctrine, since the situs of the debt was considered outside Costa Rica,
the defendant sought to reargue the case claiming that the controls were actually
"exchange contracts." See Libra Bank, Ltd. v. Banco Nacional De Costa Rica, 570 F.
Supp. 870, 884-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also William W. Park, Legal Policy Conflicts in
International Banking, 50 OHio ST. L.J. 1067,1082 (1989) (discussing the IMF Articles
of A eement with respect to the Libra Bank decision).
' Exchange contracts generally are contracts to trade currencies.
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ment), member states151 may restrict capital movements, includ-
ing payments out of bank accounts for current transactions, on
grounds of national security, but must inform the IMF immediate-
ly.152 If the IMF does not formally object within thirty days, then
the control regulation is considered approved. 153 During the
Iranian freeze, for example, the IMF's Executive Board was notified
of the United States' actions and did not formally object.154 The
regulations thus fell within the provisions of section 2(a),155 and
might have provided a valid defense had the Iranian litigation in the
United Kingdom been completed. 156 Along a parallel, though a
much more disputed vein of argument, the blocked accounts might
be considered "exchange contracts"157 involving United States
currency under section 2(b), 158 since some foreign exchange
would become involved in any repayment of deposits.
159
151 Regarding the effect on members of non-membership of other nations, see
JOSEPH GOLD, THE FUND AND NON-MEMBER STATES; SOME LEGAL EFFECTS (1966)
(claiming that restrictions on member states' dealings with non-members effectively
regulates the actions of non-members from within, so that only non-members dealings
amongst themselves are not regulated).
152 Article VIII, section 2(a) provides: "(a) Subject to [provisions requiring
notification and approval], no member shall, without the approval of the Fund,
impose restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international
transactions." Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, December
27, 1945, amendedJuly 28, 1969, reprinted inJOSEPH GOLD, VOTING AND DECISIONS IN
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND app. IX, 270 (1972) [hereinafter FUND
AGREEMENT].
153 See Edwards, supra note 70, at 874.
'54 Id. at 875.
155 Id.
156 Extensive discussion of this issue in cases before the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal can be found in 3JOSEPH GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS 79-
87 (1986).
157 There are two competing interpretations of "exchange contracts." One holds
that a true exchange contract is designed to "exchange the currency of one country
for the currency of another"; the other designates as exchange contracts, all contracts
which "prejudice exchange resources of a member state." Patrick Balfour,
Extraterritorial Recognition of Exchange co ntrol Regulations-The English Viewpoint, in THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE FINANCE 125, 129 (Norbert Horn ed., 1989).
5 Article VIII, section 2(b) provides in pertinent part: "(b) Exchange contracts
which involve the currency of any member and which are contrary to the exchange
control regulations of that member maintained or imposed consistently with this
Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member." FUND
AGREEMENT, supra note 152, at 270.
159 See Rutzke, supra note 92, at 245. The paradigm of abuse is the situation in
which the price of an export contract is inflated, with the seller generally providing
a kickback to the buyer in the desired currency outside the jurisdiction of the
currency controls. See also Werner F. Ebke, Article VIII, Section 2(b), International
Monetary Cooperation, and the Court, in FE5TSCHRIFr IN HONOR OF SIRJOSEPH GOLD
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Yet the IMF as an international governing body can hardly be
relied upon to police members as powerful as the United States, let
alone non-member money centers. According to one "politically
realistic" observer, "the IMF is a creature of its members who are
sovereign governments. In particular, it is a creature of its major
members, the major countries who collectively have the ability to
manage the system for good or for ill."16° Thus, defense of an
American action based on IMF approval, or definition of a contract
in terms of the Fund Agreement is inconclusive.
B. Summary
Having examined the common arguments used in international
financial litigation and their ramifications in freeze situations, one
can agree with Noyes Leech, who has effectively summarized the
complaints against most of these analyses: "Unfortunately, these
legal concepts and doctrines [e.g., contract law, debt situs, act of
state doctrine] lack scientific precision, have been incompletely
developed, and are understood in differing ways by different
lawyers, and no better understood by lay people, bankers and
judges."
16 1
IV. THE LEGAL-ECONOMIC NEXUS
To attack once more the essential questions-to whom and on
what grounds should a legal system allocate the risk of a freeze-one
now can turn away from previously proposed and unavailing
theories, and approach the problem instead using economic
analysis.
Since the primary focus of negotiation and litigation in
international bank deposit transactions is the assignment of both
credit and political risk, 162 the following discussion considers the
63, 73-84 (Werner F. Ebke & Joseph J. Norton eds., 1990) (discussing the narrow
American and English, and broader German interpretations of the term "exchange
contract," and public policy considerations inherent in the notion of "monetary
transactions in disguise" as commercial transactions).
160 International Financial Conditions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International
Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 262 (1979) [hereinafter International Financial Conditions Hearings] (testimony
of Benjamin J. Cohen).
161 Noyes Leech, International Banking. Effects of Nationalizations and Exchange
Controls, 8 J. CoMP. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 123, 123-24 (1986).
162 Note that the difference between political and credit risk is not entirely
distinct, nor can it be. See Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 100, at 746-61.
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transaction costs which arise when political risks are not clearly or
efficiently allocated. Although it may seem odd to consider the
United States politically risky, to the depositor on shaky foreign
relations ground, it is just that.
163
A. Coase and Perfect Markets
The Coase theorem postulates that from an efficiency perspec-
tive, the initial allocation of legal entitlements does not matter as
long as the parties, themselves best situated to evaluate their own
preferences, can bargain to obtain the cost-effective outcome: the
party to suffer the loss will bribe the least-cost risk-avoider to take
the precautions necessary to prevent the reduction in value.
164
However, such a result will necessarily ensue only in a perfect
market: one in which there are low or nonexistent transaction costs
(and a small number of parties to the bargaining); information is
available equally to all parties; and the assignment of the liability or
entitlement is clear and freely alienable.
165
In many ways, the Eurodollar market, like other financial
markets, approximates a perfectly competitive system, and would
therefore be conducive to efficient outcomes, were it not for two
primary obstacles: (1) regulatory interference, especially unexpect-
ed restraints on liquidity166 such as executive freeze orders, and
163 One recent handbook even warns of the potential effects of United States
freezes both within and outside its borders:
Persons accustomed to restrictions on foreign transactions in their own
currency may be surprised to find how little regulation of this type is in
force in the United States. They should not, however, be lulled into
assuming that international transactions into and out of the U.S. are not
well regulated. Concerns of foreign policy and national security ...
influence the U.S. regulatory system.
Additionally, one must always bear in mind the broad reach of some U.S.
laws, notably the extra-territorial application of complex or restrictive
statutes such as the anti-trust laws ....
Erica L. Gut, United States of America, in THE GUIDE TO FOREIGN EXCHANGE
REGULATIONS 319, 319 (P. Bentley & R. Crossan eds., 4th ed. 1990).
164 See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J. L. & ECON. 1, 30-34 (1960)
(expounding the theorem, using the now-famous crop versus train and spark-
prevention device); see also Robert D. Cooter, Economic Theories of Legal Liability, 5J.
ECON. PERSP., Summer 1991, at 11, 16-21 (discussing the Coase theorem and other
legal theories of liability with respect to their efficiency).16
5 See ROBERT L. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW 168 (3d ed. 1990).
166 See PAUL F. SMITH, MONEY AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 258-59 (1978)
(noting that investors must be able freely to liquidate assets or raise funds in money
markets, and that "[a]ny barriers to the movement of funds among markets will create
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(2) an unclear rule of law, as evidenced by extensive and expensive
litigation. These exogenous elements distance the markets from a
state of perfect competition by introducing political risk and
uncertainty.
1. Uncertainty Breeds Murky Legal Rules
The current system needs, but lacks, consistent legal rules which
would enable depositors and banks to anticipate and plan for
contingencies. 167 As one commentary has noted: "Unpredictabil-
ity (not to mention the prospect of confiscation and double liability)
is anathema to a banker."168 Unfortunately, different results have
been derived from such factors as the interpretations of contracts
and potentially implicit terms; boilerplate disclaimers; the currency
at issue; the manner in which the deposit was made and by whom;
the nature of the political disruption; and the target of the asset
impediment. 169 Though a depositor might well assert that she has
differentials that reflect the imperfections in the adjustment process").
167 justice Hirst recognized the mandate for a standard rule: "I am very conscious
of the need, wherever possible, for consistency of decision in commercial and banking
matters such as the present .... " Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 494, 502 (Q.B. 1988), aff'd, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 608 (Q.B.
1989); see also Leech, supra note 161, at 141 (concluding that "[b]ecause of [legal
doctrines'] uncertain content and application, litigation may lead to results the parties
would not have contemplated had transactions been fully negotiated and their terms
clarified .... The uncertainties of the search for those expectations [of parties] in
commercial practices and understandings would have been avoided.").
168 Francis D. Logan & Mark A. Kantor, Deposits at Expropriated Foreign Branches
of U.S. Banks, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 333, 354.
169 See Ngoc Quang Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164, 1166 (6th Cir. 1988)
(refusing to honor deposit agreement waiver absolving bank of "any loss or damage
suffered or incurred by any depositor resulting from government orders, laws ...
or from any other cause beyond its control" when branch closed prior to fall of South
Vietnamese government), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2602 (1990); Vishipco Line v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 866 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding bank liable to
depositors on CD after having closed bank branch in Saigon before coup), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 976 (1982); Trujillo v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 273 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1966)
(extinguishing bank's obligation under New York Banking Law § 204-a(3)(a) upon
confiscation of depositor's accounts by Dominican government); Libyan Arab Foreign
Bank v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 608, 614-19 (Q.B. 1989)
(finding two contracts with two accounts using AFTs, and the applicability of two
sovereigns' laws, based in part on stamped legend on documents); Libyan Arab
Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259, 280 (Q.B. 1988) (finding no
implied term of deposit agreement that transfers be through CHIPS); see also Garcia
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645, 648-49 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that
actions of Cuban government did not cancel bank's debt to depositor, because of
bank officers' assurances to depositors). But see Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A., 463 N.E.2d 5 (N.Y.) (holding that confiscation of branch by Cuban government
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"money in the bank," she can no longer claim with certainty that she
is entitled to retrieve it in a particular form or forum.
170
2. Transaction Costs of Uncertainty
United States regulatory interference, coupled with the inability
of courts to assign political risk consistently raises transaction costs
in the international banking system at all three stages: in the
creation of the contract, during its performance, and in the
resolution of any alleged breach.
a. Preliminary Negotiation
Because of the uncertainty of outcomes, the parties must
explicitly determine their responsibilities for political risk ex ante,
bearing the cost of increased negotiation. In an analogous vein, one
observer predicted that after the Iranian freeze, "contracts govern-
ing international loans will become even longer. Some of them
already run to 300 pages and more, partly because word processors
make it possible to incorporate ever more contingency clauses as
fast as lawyers can dream them up."171 To induce greater consis-
tency, one proposal has urged courts to treat the parties' own
privately bargained assignments of liability with greater defer-
ence: 172 "When it appears either that the bank may be forced to
withdraw from the market, or that the customer must find other
safeguards for his savings, the parties will come together to work
out a solution. Foreseeing these problems ... courts should
provide an incentive to bargain in advance." 173 Even if private
bargaining could produce efficient results in situations with valid
extinguished debt to depositor), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984).
170 See Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 100, at 787 (discussing chart of
recent deposit claim cases, and concluding that "in sum, no clear rule emerges, nor
any reliable basis for prediction").
1 Mendelsohn, supra note 121, at 1, 15. Note, however, that a depositor cannot
contractually assign subjection to government regulation, since such a contract would
be in violation of the public policy of the blockage; the interest premium paid is
advance compensation for this risk.
" Not unlike the IMF, international commercial and banking organizations which
promulgate codes and provide arbitration lack binding authority, providing only
persuasive evidence in subsequent courtroom battles. See e.g., W. LAURENCE CRAIG
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION xxi-xxii (2d ed. 1990)
(noting that "parties to an ICC arbitration would affirm only that they were honor
bound to carry out the award of the arbitrators"). Concerning the IMF, see supra
notes 150-60 and accompanying text regarding the IMF.
17 Johnson, supra note 116, at 246.
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express disclaimers, 174 sophisticated parties, 175 and an absence
of political pressure, 176 the time-sensitive, wire-mediated Eurodol-
lar market is still not conducive to bargaining during each trade
over much more than price.
b. Managed Accounts and Similar Arrangements
The United States' political risk after the Iranian and Libyan
freezes in particular, as seen from the viewpoint of depositors on
tenuous foreign relations ground with the United States, signalled
loudly that "unguarded" investment in dollars would be ill-ad-
vised. 177 Managed account arrangements may be seen as transac-
tion costs 178 incurred in attempts to protect against the uncertain-
ty of legal results and the risk of political regulation, without
compromising depositors' returns from Eurodollars, or credit
security from American banks.
179
174 Cf. Ngoc Quang Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164, 1166, 1172 (6th Cir.
1988) (holding that Citibank's disclaimer in a deposit contract was not sufficient to
relieve the home office of the branch's debt when the branch closed before being
expropriated), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2602 (1990).
175 Most participants in the Eurodollar market, if they are dealing in increments
of $1 million or more, must be considered sophisticated. Thus, the potential for the
standard adhesion contract problem is dissipated.
176 Johnson suggests that in many cases the parties are sufficiently sophisticated
that no problems of coercive bargaining or contracts of adhesion arise. SeeJohnson,
supra note 116, at 247 (citing Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d
854, 856-57 (2d Cir. 1981) (depositors were ten shipping companies) and Garcia v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645, 646 (depositor was Cuban senator and
owner of many successful businesses)). Timing is crucial as well, since bargaining in
the face of impending violence or freeze might later be considered coercive.
177 See Gross, supra note 98, at 471, (citing Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers
Trust, Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259 (Q.B. 1988)).
178 Banks profited from the arrangement. Bankers Trust received remuneration
in the form of the benefit of an interest-free balance of between $500,000 and
$599,999, the "peg" amount plus the $100,000 increment, plus retained interest on
excess credit after 2:00 p.m. (e.s.t.) on business as well as non-working days. See
Bankers Trust, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 264.
179 See Bankers Trust, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 263-67. After the first shock of the Iranian
freeze, OPEC and other Arab countries went to great lengths to arrange managed
accounts to reduce their United States political risk exposure. A managed account
should not be confused with the standard relationship between foreign branch and
corresponding bank necessary to create Eurodollars.
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c. Litigation
Uncertainty has fostered increased litigation and its associated
costs.1 80 The Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. decisions
supply a notorious example of a single case generating exorbitant
costs, without producing a governing rule for international deposit
disputes.' 8 ' Litigation costs incurred in court battles do not
cancel out the windfall a party may receive when a court decides in
its favor; the opposing party incurs parallel costs, without the
benefit of a favorable decision.182  High litigation costs are a
180 Given uncertainty, the mistaken view that increasing expenses can insure a
favorable outcome may even result in irrational overpayment: "Randomness ...
brings with it more litigation.... More randomness also means that the litigants are
more likely to disagree about the likely outcome of a case .... They won't find a
mutually beneficial compromise. Differences in opinion don't only make for horse
races; they also make for litigation." Leo Herzel & Leo Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom:
The Business ofjudging BusinessJudgment, 41 BUS. LAW. 1187, 1191 (1986).
181 The issue whether Citibank was required to pay a CD issued by its Manila
branch to Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. after the Central Bank of the Philippines imposed
exchange controls came first before the District Court for the Southern District of
New York. See Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 612 F.Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (denying summaryjudginent). Recovery was subsequently allowed. See Wells
Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 660 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Appeal was
taken (unpublished opinion, 847 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1988), and the Court of Appeals
subsequently remanded for supplemental findings. See Wells Fargo Ltd. v. Citibank,
N.A., 695 F. Supp. 1450 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). It also ruled. See Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v.
Citibank, N.A., 852 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1988) (aft'g judgment below). The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, ruled that the district court's findings had not been clearly
erroneous, and remanded the case to the appellate court to determine the applicable
law, and whether repayment might be required in New York. See Citibank, NA. v.
Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 110 S. Ct. 2034 (1990). The Second Circuit ruled on remand.
See Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 936 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1991). The
Supreme Court expressly avoided declaring a federal common law rule regarding
bank deposits.
After the Supreme Court provided what many consider to have been a less than
insightful decision on this crucial and complex issue, ChiefJustice Rehnquist wrote,
"[O]ne may fairly inquire as to why certiorari was granted. The opinion decides no
novel or undecided question of federal law .... I do not believe that granting
plenary review in a case such as this is a wise use of our limited judicial resources."
Wells Fargo, 110 S. Ct. at 2034, 2042-43 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Considering
litigation and court costs today, it is regrettable that the Supreme Court squandered
the opportunity to set a rule of law governing such circumstances.
UltimatelyJudge Kearse, writing for the Second Circuit, found that Citibank was
required to repay Wells Fargo out of its worldwide assets. See Wells Fargo Asia Ltd.
v. Citibank, N.A., 936 F.2d 723, 725, 728 (2d Cir. 1991). But the saga continues. See
Wells Fargo, 60 U.S.L.W. 3360 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1991) (No. 91-689) (filing petition for
certiorari).
182 In the Libyan cases, the depositors got the windfall benefit of repayment of
their deposits despite risk premiums already paid to them by the bank to cover just
such contingencies. Attempts to recharacterize their litigation costs as appropriate
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symptom of an inefficient system without predictable rules; they are
not appropriate payments to achieve a particular outcome.
B. Finding an Efficient Rule: Calabresi
Given the uncertainty of courts' assignments of liability and the
potential for American political action, the rule of risk allocation
which most closely tracks the adjustment parties would have made
under the Coase theorem, will provide the most efficient outcome.
Using Calabresi's guidelines,1 83 an efficient method of risk alloca-
tion will attempt to make a good initial guess of the least-cost risk
avoider, cause parties to internalize their costs, and assign risk to
the party best able to make corrections through the market.
184
As will be explained below, an evaluation of Eurodollar and
domestic interest rate differentials points towards the efficient
allocation of risk to the debtor in a freeze crisis, as will be explained
below.
1. The Risk-Return Tradeoff
Higher returns induce depositors to make riskier deposits, given
the basic premise that an individual's utility function may be plotted
as a tradeoff between risk and the rate of return.
1 85
risk avoidance payments which eliminate any windfall neglects that: (1) payment of
attorneys' fees alone does not insure a favorable outcome (and bribing judges is
illegal); and (2) the opposing party must pay analogous fees, thus preserving a net
gain to the winner in the amount of her windfall.
1
8
3 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 140-73 (1970). Calabresi has
noted that total deterrence of accident-causing activities is not necessarily desirable;
rather the market, relying on prices to reflect the true costs of activities should serve
to effect "general deterrence," allowing society to substitute safer, less expensive
activities. Id. at 68-69. A clear analogy may be drawn to the United States' decision
to engage in freezes, once it has weighed its costs in comparison to other alternatives,
such as diplomatic negotiation or trade embargoes.
184 See id. at 144-45, 150-52.
185 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 166, at 102-06 (discussing risk aversion as a barrier
to investment).
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a. Sources of Interest Rate Differentials:18 6 Cost and Risk
Because of reduced costs and increased risk,187 Eurodollar
deposits command a higher return than deposits in the United
States. 188 The cost components derive from regulations designed
to reduce credit risk, such as reserve requirements and deposit
insurance, from which funds payable only at foreign branches are
excused under Regulations D189 and Q190 respectively. Consid-
ering the flip side of the coin, Eurodollar returns are higher because
of greater perceived risks. 191 Credit risk of overseas branches
186 As an analogue to the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, which suggests
that all relevant information is reflected in the market price of a stock, one might
similarly argue that interest rates reflect basic cost and risk information as perceived
by the market. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theoty, the Market
for Corporate Contro4 and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3-5
(1978) (discussing the theory and its weak, semi-strong, and strong incarnations); see
also STIGUM, MONEY MARKET, supra note 9, at 592-95 (discussing the existence of an
active arbitrage market).
187 Cost and risk are the preeminent, but not the only, reasons for the interest
rate differential. Investors will also pay a premium for secrecy, as is evidenced by the
continued attractiveness of Swiss and other monetary (and tax) havens. See generally
INGO WALTER, THE SECRET MONEY MARKET 8 (1990) (discussing what the author
terms a "secrecy seeker's surplus," and suggesting that an investor may be willing to
accept higher costs imposed in the form of lower interest rates on deposits in return
for a guarantee of confidentiality).
'" See M. Ann Hannigan, United States Home Bank Liability for Foreign Branch
Deposits, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 735,738 ("[B]y using foreign branches, American banks
can loan out a larger percentage of their capital reserves at higher interest rates, and,
at the same time, offer a higher rate of interest to depositors.").
189 12 C.F.R. § 204.1(c)(5) (1991) (Regulation D, stating in pertinent part that the
reserve requirement provisions "do not apply to any deposit that is payable only at
an office located outside the United States"); id. § 204.2(t) (1991) (clarifying the term
deposit, "as to which the depositor is entitled, under the agreement with the
institution, to demand payment only outside the United States"); see also, MAYER ET
AL., supra note 9, at 527 ("Reserve requirements are an implicit tax on deposits.").
190 12 C.F.R. § 217.1(c)(2) (1991) (Regulation Q, excluding foreign deposits from
interest rate limits); Lawrence L. Kreicher, Eurodollar Arbitrage, FED. RESERVE BANK
N.Y. Q. REV., Summer 1982, at 10, 13 (noting that the basic FDIC assessment has
typically been 1/12 of one percent of total deposits); see also MAYER ET AL., supra note
9, at 527.
191 Since one of the functions of money is to serve as a "medium for storing value
through time," the investor must be assured that the chosen investment and currency
will withstand risks over that period. See J. Carter Murphy, International Moneys:
Official and Private, in FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF SIRJOSEPH GOLD, supra note 159,
at 237, 239; see also EdwardJ. Frydl, The Eurodollar Conundrum, FED. RESERVE BANK
N.Y. Q. REV., Spring 1982, at 11, 12 (noting the potential for arbitrage between
foreign and domestic markets based on these discrepancies).
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stems from their lack of both insurance on Eurodollar deposits and
direct access to the Federal Reserve discount window. 192 But
since central banks of the largest participants have agreed to bail
out branches of their own Eurocurrency market members
1 93
should the threat of insolvency arise, 194 credit risk premiums
provide only a means of comparing banks, not comparing Eurodol-
lar and dollar deposits.
195
b. Political Risk: Bribing Depositors to Assume Risk
in the Eurodollar Market
Parties bargain over political risk, 196 as they do over credit
risk, by "tiering." Banks "pay up" more or less, offering premiums
commensurate with depositors' perceptions of risk.197 The practi-
192 Banks in dire straits frequently borrow from the Fed discount window at
reduced rates. The head office, however, will generally assume responsibility for the
credit failures of a branch. See Kassa, supra note 43, at 137-38 (noting that "[b]ecause
banks consider themselves at fault for a branch's failure to pay due to insolvency or
financial mismanagement, they consider the head office or parent bank to be liable
to a depositor for such 'credit risk,' in contrast to liability for 'sovereign risk'").
193 See STIGUM, MONEY MARKETS, supra note 9, at 176 (noting that central banks
could rescue their respective countries' banks "either from their own reserves or by
obtaining dollars through swaps from the Fed").
194 Professor Herring has demonstrated the devastating results of liquidity and
credit shocks on the fragile interbank payment system. See RICHARD J. HERRING,
PRESSURES ON THE PLUMBING OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: THE
THREAT OF SYSTEMIC RISK 13 (International Banking Center Working Paper) (1991)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (citing David B. Humphrey,
Payments Finality and Risk of Settlement Failure, in TECHNOLOGY AND THE REGULATION
OF FINANCIAL MARKETS, SECURITIES, FUTURES, AND BANKING 97 (Anthony Saunders
& Lawrence J. White eds., 1986) (study simulating the application of the "unwind
rule" in the event of the failure of a major CHIPS settling institution, and warning
that such a rule could easily "transform idiosyncratic credit risk into systemic risk"));
see also STIGUM, MONEY MARKET, supra note 9, at 175. Banks have been particularly
fearful due to failures and scandals. See id. at 146-47, 177-81 (discussing both the
Herstatt failure, which prompted the GlO to issue the Basel Concordat in 1974,
promising to provide temporary support to banks in international markets
experiencing liquidity problems; and the later Banco Ambrosiano scandal).
"9 The aphorism that a bank is "too big to fail" aptly denotes that branches' credit
needs will be adequately served by the home office. The following quip seems to say
it all: "'If you owe your bank a hundred pounds, you have a problem; but if you owe
a million, it has.'" William W. Park, When the Borrower and the Banker Are At Odds:
The Interaction ofJudge and Arbitrator in Trans-Border Finance 65 TUL. L. REV. 1323,
1323 (1991) (quotingJohn Maynard Keynes).
196 Branches in certain world regions must typically pay higher returns. See
STIGUM, MONEY MARKET, supra note 9, at 578-79 ("[i]nvestors perceive some political
risk associated with Mideast banks," and noting that different time zones may also
have an effect on deposit rates, as do liquidity and maturity).
197 See STIGUM, MONEY MARKET, supra note 9, at 578-79; see also Kassa, supra note
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cal realities of the investors' evaluation of risk must have an
indelible effect on a court's determination of depositors' and banks'
liability for that risk. 198 By investing in Eurodollars in London,
for example, depositors are compensated with higher returns for the
risk that action may be taken 199 by the currency-issuing country
(United States), bank-chartering country (also United States) and
host country (England).2" The depository institution and the
depositor thus acquiesce in the market interest rate as the price of
their contract, and seem to have accounted for political risk by
assigning it to the depositor. In the Eurodollar market, then, the
allocation of risk by the judicial system to the debtor branch bestows
a windfall on the depositor. Under such a rule, the depositor,
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank, for example, reaps the benefits of higher
Eurodollar returns and assured repayment, while being protected
from the political risk of the currency-issuing and bank-chartering
country, the United States,20 1 at no cost.
Criticisms of this interest rate differential analysis stem from
comparisons of "snapshots" of interest rates which are not, however,
dispositive. In Citibank v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., after the Philippine
Central Bank imposed exchange controls on foreign currency,
20 2
43, at 169-70.
198 Two commentators have noted, "[A]t times interest rate differentials have
considerably exceeded those related to pure cost considerations, because nonbank
depositors have wished to hold their wealth in the United States or because banks
have wished to expand liabilities at their non-U.S. offices." TERRELL & MILLS, supra
note 9, at 9.
199 See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
200 One expert witness for Citibank testified that he found it "'inconceivable' that
a sophisticated international bank depositor would claim ignorance of... the rules
of the game, the most pertinent of which is that a consideration for the higher
interest rate earned by a Eurodollar deposit is the depositor's agreement to assume
a 'sovereign risk.'" Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 612 F. Supp. 351, 353
(D.C.N.Y. 1985); 660 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); 847 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1988),
remanded for supplemental findings, 695 F. Supp. 1450 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); 852 F.2d 657
(2d Cir. 1988); remanded, 110 S.Ct. 2034, 1990; on remand, 936 F.2d 723 (2d Cir.
1991); petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3360 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1991) (No. 91-689).
201 This results because the depositor is considered the risk-bearer, but is relieved
of the burden by the court. See e.g., Ngoc Quang Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d
1164, 1176 (6th Cir. 1988) (Brown, J., dissenting) (noting that particularly during
periods when interest rate caps were in effect, the Fed "encouraged" and "permitted
foreign branches [of United States banks] to offer unusually attractive interest rates
in exchange for the depositors' acceptance of the risk of political upheaval"), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 2602 (1990).
202 See Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 110 S. Ct. 2034, 2038 (1990)
(quoting the control providing- "'"Any remittance of foreign exchange for repayment
of principal on all foreign obligations due to foreign banks and/or financial
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defendant Citibank refused to use its worldwide assets to repay
certificates of deposit (CDs) purchased previously by the plaintiff,
Wells Fargo. Citibank argued that the CDs were payable only in
Manila, given the higher return offered on them, claiming it was
only able to pay a rate of interest higher than that offered within
the United States due to the lower cost of offshore funds,
20 3
which are exempted from Regulation D.2 04
In rejecting Citibank's arguments and concluding that the bank
was not necessarily relieved of its obligation, 20 5 the Supreme
Court placed great emphasis on interest rates, but compared only
(1) returns offered in London and Manila, not Manila and New
York, and (2) returns at the time of deposit, regardless of expecta-
tions regarding the relative rates over time. That the rates offered
on June 10, 1983 (the day the CD was purchased) in London and
Manila were the same206 says nothing of the premium paid in any
event over dollar deposits in the United States. 20 7 Moreover, the
institutions... shall be submitted to the Central Bank [of the Philippines] .... "'"
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)); see also Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra
note 100, at 763 (reproducing in pertinent part the Central Bank of the Philippines,
Memorandum to Authorized Agent Banks (MAAB No. 47)).
203 See Wells Fargo, 110 S. Ct. at 2041. The Brown dissent in Trinh similarly cites
the Federal Reserve Board, which "expressly warned banks that the reserve and
interest exemptions would no longer apply to deposits in foreign branches if banks
'entered into agreements... with depositors that in effect guarantee payment of
such deposits in the United States if the foreign branch is precluded from making
payment.'" Trinh, 850 F.2d at 1177.
204 See 12 C.F.R. § 204.1(c)(5) (Regulation D, stating in pertinent part that the
reserve requirement provisions "do not apply to any deposit that is payable only at
an office located outside the United States."); id. § 204.2(t) (1991) (clarifying the
clause: a deposit, "as to which the depositor is entitled, under the agreement with the
institution, to demand payment only outside the United States"); see also Regulation
Q, id. § 217 .1(c)(2) (excluding foreign branch deposits from domestic interest rate
limitations).
205 See Wells Fargo, 110 S. Ct. at 2041. The Court rejected Citibank's argument,
"that higher rates [offered for Eurodollar deposits] reflected the depositor's
assumption.., that actions by the foreign government having legal control over the
foreign branch and its assets would render the branch unable to repay the deposit."
Id. (citations omitted).
206 The Supreme Court found:
[T]he identical interest rates being offered for Eurodollars deposits in both
Manila and London at the time the deposits were made [June 10, 1983],
despite the conceded differences in sovereign risk between the two
locations, reflected an understanding that the home office of a bank was
liable for repayment in the event that its foreign branch was unable to repay
for any reason, including restrictions imposed by a foreign government.
Id. (citations omitted).
207 Professor Herring has suggested that equivalent interest rates between branch
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interest rates offered in London and Manila did diverge between
August 1983, when the opposition leader Benigno Aquino was
assassinated,208 and October 15, 1983, when the Central Bank of
the Philippines imposed foreign currency controls, specifically to
prevent the flight of capital.20 9
c. Asymmetrical Information: The Depositor as the
Least-Cost Risk Avoider
Assigning risk to the depositor is the cost-efficient outcome
because the depositor is also better able than the branch to evaluate,
monitor, and control risk exposure through diversification. In the
Iranian crisis, American hostages had been seized ten days before
the freeze order was issued.210 Similarly, a series of terrorist acts
had been perpetrated against the United States before the Libyan
freeze was imposed. 211 Only in the Iraqi-Kuwaiti situation was
there a shorter lag time, with the order issued overnight2 12 (but
the connection between the foreign government and the offensive
action was all the more explicit). Given the close alliance between
certain governments and violent political groups, it is reasonable to
expect the communication of at least some information which would
enable the depositor to withdraw funds from American banks, thus
avoiding the risk of a freeze.
213
offices does not disprove the contention that parties expect the depositor to bear
political (what he terms "sovereign") risk:
[I]t is clear that market expectations regarding the allocation of sovereign
risk in the residentialjurisdiction cannot be inferred from a comparison of
interest rates on Eurodollar deposits between safe and risky centers ....
That Eurodollar interest rates are the same in Frankfurt and Manila is not
necessarily inconsistent with the hypothesis that market participants expect
depositors will bear sovereign risk in the residential jurisdiction.
Herring, Who Bears The Risk?, supra note 45, at 10.
208 See e.g., Chiller in Manila: Citibank Freezes Deposits, FORTUNE, Feb. 20, 1984,
at 7 (quoting senior Citibank official's comment: "Any bank that didn't know it was
assuming Philippine sovereign risk by placing its money with us in Manila is naive.");
see also Sim, supra note 116, at 1044 & nn.26-27 (noting the enormous capital flight
which drained the Philippines of foreign exchange, and necessitated the controls after
Aquino's assassination).
209 See Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 100, at 763.
210 See Harold H. Saunders, The Crisis Begins, in AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN,
supra note 68, at 35, 35-36 (detailing the early stages of the hostage crisis).
211 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
212 See Exec. Order No. 12,722, 3 C.F.R. 294 (1991) (blocking transactions with
Ira; filed at 9:44 a.m. (e.s.t.), Aug. 2, 1990, and effective immediately).
13 See Carswell & Davis, Financial Pressures, supra note 68, at 175-76. The authors
note that the decision to implement the Iranian freeze was made shortly after the
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Despite such asymmetrical information arguments, some courts
have nevertheless held banks liable at their head offices, 2 14 invok-
ing banks' "assumption of the risk"215 by maintaining branches in
"risky" locations, or in the case of a freeze, 216 by accepting the
deposits of creditors whose assets were perhaps likely to be blocked.
Forcing banks to assume the risk will result in an efficiency loss,
since they are not able to distinguish between depositors in an
anonymous Eurodollar market, nor would they be able to compete
for funds if they offered lower rates to particularly risk-ridden
depositors. One might also argue that a bank should monitor the
sources of deposits for its own protection.2 17 But one would still
Acting Foreign and Finance Minister Bani-Sadr announced on November 14, 1979
that Iran would remove its assets from United States banks. Plans to implement the
freeze were accelerated after news on November 9 that the head of Iran's central
bank, Bank Markazi, was discharged or resigned due to resistance to a plan to
withdraw the funds. Id. A rule which would force the offending nation to withdraw
funds prior to aggression could potentially serve to alert American and other
governments of impending violence.
214 See, e.g., Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645, 650 (2d Cir.
1984) (noting that the bank "accepted the risk'" of liability for its branch's actions)
(quoting Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982)).
215 In Ngovc Quang Trinh v. Citibank, the court noted: "By operating a branch
office in Vietnam, Citibank indicated to its foreign depositors that it accepted the risk
that, in at least some circumstances, it would be liable elsewhere for obligations
incurred by its branch." Ngoc Quang Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164, 1169
(6th Cir. 1988) (citing Vishipco, 660 F.2d at 863), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2602 (1990).
216 See, e.g., Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 100, at 790:
Cuba in 1958-59, Vietnam in 1974-75, even the Philippines in 1983 were
obviously not what a prudent banker would regard as risk-free nations. Even
the United States, seen from Tripoli in the 1980s (or Libya, seen from New
York) could not be regarded as free from the possibility of sudden changes.
Id.
217 Indeed, monitoring deposits for money laundering investigation purposes is
required under the Bank Secrecy Act (Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting
Act), Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d,
1829b, 1951-1959, 31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311-5324, and scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.
(1988)). Further regulations impose reporting requirements on banks, even
restricting them from notifying any party, including the foreign financial institution
or customer involved, of the existence of the monitoring. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R.
§ 103.25(a) (1991) ("[T]he [Treasury] Secretary may prohibit disclosure of the
existence or provisions of [the] reporting requirement to the designated [parties].").
Thus, for a bank to request that a party withdraw deposits, one potential way to
reduce risk associated with a freeze-prone depositor would be in contravention of the
regulations; refusing funds outright from an otherwise legitimate customer would be
commercial folly. See Bruce Zagaris, Dollar Diplomacy: International Enforcement of
Money Movement and Related Matters-A United States Pespective, 22 GEO. WASH.J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 465, 486-94 (1989) (discussing administrative responses through the
Treasury and IRS to trace deposits related to criminal activity).
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have to concede that it is easier for a national bank/depositor, such
as LAFB, to control its liability because it is more closely informed
of movements of the government or militant groups.
V. THE ECONOMIC-POLITICAL NExus: USING EFFICIENT RISK
ALLOCATION TO INTERNALIZE POLITICAL COSTS
In producing the market efficient result, a rule assigning liability
to the depositor would have the much needed effect of forcing the
United States to internalize the costs of its political actions, without
damaging Eurocurrency centers, since depositors would merely shift
funds out of American branches and into other accounts in
London. 21 8 The imposition of a freeze intertwines the financial
marketplace with a political one in which parties seek to maximize
power rather than profit. Courts must resolve the two simulta-
neous, parallel "transactions." But as long as foreign courts refuse
to enforce American freeze orders, the United States evades the cost
of its actions, and continues to impose significant transaction costs
on the Eurodollar market in the form of increased negotiation,
performance, and litigation fees.
A. Advantages and Costs of Executive Freeze Orders
Asset freezes can fulfill a range of foreign policy goals and thus
ought not to be entirely eliminated. Freezes may be speedily
implemented to: (1) express immediate disapproval of a target's
actions; (2) disrupt a military "adventure" by impairing a target's
potential;2 19 (3) take action commensurate with other nations'
expectations, while avoiding the use of force; 220 and (4) amass
funds to satisfy potential settlement claims.221 Once issued, the
218 In fact, LAFB sought to do just that after its assets were frozen. See Libyan
Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259,268 (Q.B. 1988) (seeking
payment to its dollar account at U.B.A.F. Bank Limited London).2 19 See GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
RECONSIDERED: HIsToRY AND CURRENT PoLIcY 29 (1985).
220 For example, seemingly due in part to pressure by Haiti, the Organization of
American States, and the ousted PresidentJean-Bertrand Aristide, President Bush
signed an executive order freezing the Haitian government's assets, and forbidding
United States citizens from making payments to the new government after the coup
led by Brigadier General Raoul Cedras. See Haiti's Assembly Names Interim President,
51 FACTs ON FILE, Oct. 754B3, 755A2 (1991).
221 The Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury, conducted
a census of potential claims and published it on February 11, 1991 to enable it to
monitor losses after the Iraqi invasion and after the commencement of Operation
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freeze order can take immediate effect 222 by making financing
impossible, 223 whereas trade embargoes 224 or United Nations
sanctions may take much longer. It can be tailored to enable the
Treasury and State Department to control closely the flow of funds,
for use as a "bargaining chip," redeemable once diplomatic
preconditions have been met.
225
Desert Storm on January 16, 1991. See 31 C.F.R. Pt. 575 (1991). One theorist has
noted that in suggesting the creation of a claims council and compensation fund
under its auspices, the United Nations "may have created the 'mother of all
international arbitration battles.'" StanleyJ. Glod, International Claims Arising From
Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, 25 INT'L LAW. 713, 721 (1991) (author is the Chairman of
the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission).
222 Note, however, that a delay in signing the order into effect can nullify the
order in practical terms. For example, President Reagan, without any administrative
explanation, took five months to sign the executive order freezing assets of Jean-
Claude Duvalier, resulting in the failure to apprehend more of his funds. See Elaine
Sciolino, Reagan Orders Assets of the Duvalies Frozen, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1987, at A5.
2 Often such an action will cease nearly all a foreign country's transactions since
many international contracts are denominated in dollars. This halts trade. See
HUFBAUER & SCHorr, supra note 219, at 27-29; see also Administration and Enforcement
of U.S. Export Control Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (forthcoming, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File) (statement of R. Richard Newcomb, Director,
Office of Foreign Assets Control) (noting that the President's orders in the Gulf crisis
"interfered with or halted altogether billions of dollars of capital flows. These
included foreign exchange contracts, oil payments, repurchase agreements and
currency swaps, payments to international banking syndicates, and a wide variety of
overnight investment arrangements involving capital markets in different political
jurisdictions").
224 See HUFBAUER & SCHoTr, supra note 219, at 59 (noting that there is generally
less backlash by American firms in response to trade than financial embargoes). Some
trade embargoes purporting to have overseas reach, such as the Siberian Gas Pipeline
case, have had drastically negative effects in that United States allies have refused to
abide by them. See e.g., Tom Harris, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Export
Controls: A British Perspective, 19 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 959, 959-61 (1987) (noting
that the United Kingdom expressly forbids its own firms to comply with the United
States embargo on goods or services for use in the construction of the West Siberian
gas pipeline).
225 See Gross, supra note 98, at 473 n.10 (notingTreasury license enabling Bankers
Trust to pay after the London litigation was resolved). Analogously, in exchange for
the release of a British chemical engineer, the British government unblocked the
equivalent of $125 million in frozen Iraqi funds deposited with London banks in
accordance with provisions of the United Nations Security Council. See Paul Lewis,
Iraq Frees Briton as London Unblocks Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1991, at A7. Freezes
may also be finely tuned with licenses to act as protective orders. The United States
froze Kuwaiti assets as a protective measure just as it froze the assets of the Danish
and Norwegian governments in the face of Nazi seizures during World War II. See
Exec. Order No. 8389, 3 C.F.R. § 645 (1938) (invoking the Trading With the Enemy
Act).
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But asset freezes have been imposed before policymakers have
thoroughly considered their costs.2 26 Externalities, costs a party
does not take into account in choosing action, that arise from
executive freeze orders include: (1) threats to the American
banking system227, specifically, "reverse diversification,"22 s and
declining use of the dollar as a reserve currency; 229 (2) threats to
the City of London's preeminence as an off-shore currency
center;23° (3) increased transaction costs to the Eurodollar mar-
ket;23 ' and (4) resentment of American assertions of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction. 23 2  In contrast to policy-makers' myopia, one
banker has noted that, "[t]he first thing that comes to the mind of
a banker is... whether the action will, over the longer term, impair
the position of the United States as an international financial
market, ... and thus also impair the standing of the dollar as an
international currency."
2 33
226 Carswell has noted that "[floreign policy makers do not always give weight to
the ... cost-effectiveness of the imposition of a unilateral economic sanction by the
United States. Rather than work through a rigorous analysis, they justify the
imposition of a sanction by some variation of sonorous themes...." Carswell, supra
note 56, at 257.
227 See id. at 262-63 (noting that "there has been a noticeable decline in the
proportion of OPEC assets held in the form of direct claims against U.S. banks and
their major foreign branches").
228 One critic has written: "Over the longer term... should Washington be seen
as developing an addiction to asset freezes... significant diversification into other
countries' institutions and currencies could yet occur, and that could indeed be costly
for the competitiveness of American banks. One can go to the well only so often."
BENJAMINJ. COHEN, IN WHOSE INTEREST?: INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND AMERICAN
FOREIGN PoucY 171 (1986) (discussing the interdependence of high finance and high
politics, and advocating regular, structured dialogue).
229 See generally BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, RECENT INNOVATIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL BANKING 157 (1986) (Group of Ten study finding growing use of
non-dollar currencies for investment purposes due to deregulation, especially in
Japan, Germany, France, and the Netherlands).
230 See Justice Hirst's expression of concern, supra notes 140-41 and accompa-
nynf text.
1 See supra notes 171-82 and accompanying text.
232 Unilateral extraterritorial freeze orders, like other American legislation
perceived as over-reaching, have not endeared the United States to its allies. See e.g.,
William Knighton, Britain: Blocking and Claw-back, in ACT OF STATE AND ExTRATERRI-
TORIAL REACH 52, 54-56 (John R. Lacey ed., 1983) (discussing blocking legislation in
response to the extraterritorial reach of American antitrust law).
23 International Financial Conditions Hearings, supra note 160, at 195 (statement
of Dennis Weatherstone, Vice Chairman of the Board, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.,
New York). This sentiment was echoed in testimony ofAnthony M. Solomon, Under
Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs, in response to Sen. Adlai E.
Stevenson's question whether it was "the policy of the United States to block assets
every time a depositor threatens to withdraw a deposit that might have an adverse
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B. Virtues of Uncertainty: the Contrary View
As a brief digression, consider that in a world with seemingly
irrational behavior, 23 4 such as international acts of terrorism
23 5
and aggression, 236 the best response may very well be correspond-
ingly irrational behavior through legally inconsistent decisions.
23 7
Thomas Schelling, one of the earliest theorists (though not a
proponent) of the "tactic of cultivating irrationality at the highest
level of government" has written: "Another paradox of deterrence
is that it does not always help to be, or to be believed to be, fully
rational, cool-headed, and in control of one self or one's coun-
try." 238 In the face of countries or depositors which, from the
United States' point of view, irrationally sponsor terrorist activi-
ties 23 9 while maintaining assets in the United States or denominat-
ed in dollars abroad, legally inconsistent treatment, and unexpected
imposition of freezes could serve as a valid response and counter-
threat to acts of aggression. But over an extended period, rather
than as an isolated incident, such treatment will not foster stable
international transactions, or the sustained predominance of the
dollar in Euromarkets.
effect on American creditors." Id. at 17. Costs of the Iranian freeze included short-
run instability in financial markets, evidenced by an increase in the price of gold. See
id. at 66 (testimony ofJohn G. Hermann, Comptroller of the Currency), pressures on
interest rates, and the dollar in exchange markets.234 See generally CLAIRE STERLING, THE TERROR NETWORK: THE SECRET WAR OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (1981) (writing about left-wing international terrorism
during the 1970s).
235 Although some would quibble over the difference between "terrorists" and
"freedom fighters," terrorist is used here to refer to one who systematically uses
violence against civilians to achieve an end, regardless of the political endorsement.
236 See, e.g., R. G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris, Violence, Terrorism, and Justice, in
VIOLENCE, TERRORISM, ANDJUSTICE 10-11 (R. G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris eds.,
1991) (discussing terrorism and the rules ofjustice).
237 See Herzel & Katz, supra note 180, at 1191-93 (discussing the irrational
component of rational decision-making). Professor Leo Katz has spoken of this
option as purposely taking an "irrationality pill."2 38 THOMAS C. SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE vii, 37 (1966).
239 The frontispiece of one book on terrorism sums up this view and its
counterpart in the comment of a member of Italy's Red Brigades to a reporter: "'You
think it's absurd that I should go out and shoot a man just because I'm ordered to?
That's your bourgeois mentality. Don't you think it's absurd that you're ordered to
go out and write an article?'" STERLING, supra note 234, at viii.
EXTRATERRITORIAL FREEZE ORDERS
C. Reigning in Freezes: Consequences of the
Risk Allocation Rule
The enforcement of freeze orders extraterritorially would drive
the threats home, forcing the United States to internalize costs at
the expense of the American banking industry. Before imposing
another freeze it might then act in a well-considered manner,240
in conjunction with other countries, as during the Persian Gulf
Crisis, rather than imposing unilateral extraterritorial freezes.
241
CONCLUSION
The need for a consistent rule on which parties can rely is
paramount for the smooth operation of commercial transactions
and the stability of international financial markets. Future crises are
bound to arise, 242 and legal doctrines previously applied to freeze
situations have been unable to provide predictable, rather than
interest- and result-oriented, rules. Foreign, and American courts
should use an economic analysis to allocate risk between the
depositor and depository institution, thus efficiently assigning
liability, according to the parties' own market bargaining, to the
depositor as the least-cost risk avoider. The United States would
240 One writer has suggested the restriction of IEEPA freezes by: imposing sunset
and contract-sanctity provisions, making consultation with Congress mandatory,
including criteria, and restricting extraterritorial jurisdiction. See Barry E. Carter,
International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 1159, 1274-77 (1987). Though imaginative, such qualifications of the
President's powers would reduce the swift efficacy of an appropriately imposed freeze.
241 The United States might consider restricting the scope of freezes to accounts
definitively kept within its territory, as the United Kingdom did in blockingArgentine
accounts held in British banks during the Malvinas affair. See Francis D. Logan &
Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, Political Dams Across Financial Flows, in PRIVATE INVESTORS
ABROAD 13-17 (Janice R. Moss ed., 1986); see also Harris, supra note 224, at 971 (citing
the OECD's support of a policy encouraging member states to promote cooperation
as an alternative to unilateral action).
242 Eugene F. Mooney's early comprehensive study of foreign seizures concludes
in part as follows:
The millpond of International law is lost in Academe's
Glade,
Obscured by the fog of the Pedagogue's awe and
jurisprudential shade.
Each generation a Nationalist breeze, in disregard of the
rule,
Breaks through the staid professorial trees and ripples the
murky pool.
MOONEY, supra note 130, at 159.
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then be forced to recognize the costs of its foreign policy actions
and restrict them accordingly.
